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Abstract
A large literature on the regulation of banks has explained deposit
rate control (ceilings) and capital requirements as alternative reg-
ulatory instruments for reducing moral hazard issues (i.e. the
propensity of banks to take too large risks). Over the last 30-40
years, almost uniformly, regulators have moved from regimes re-
lying on the former instrument to ones using the latter. Hitherto
the theoretical literature does not seem to offer much support for
this policy change whereas our contribution seeks to establish a
real trade-off between the two regulatory regimes. In our model,
which is an adaptation of that of Repullo (2004), the deadweight
loss of capital control is its higher opportunity cost as compared
to the returns derived from normal banking activities. There are
several potential costs associated with deposit rate ceilings, but
inspired by the observed consolidation of the banking sector after
the liberalization that took place in the eighties, we focus on one:
the tendency towards excess entry in the banking sector. While
historically, and unlike in our stylized model, entry was not free
for banks, we argue that the excess profits associated with deposit
rate ceilings are likely to have put (political) pressure on regula-
tors to allow an increased number of banks, with associated costs
for society. We show that, with the trade-off as described above,
and depending on the parameter configuration, each of the two
regimes may welfare-dominate the other.
Keywords: Banking regulation, moral hazard, deposit rate con-
trol, capital requirements, Salop model.
JEL classification: D43, D82, G21, G28.
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1 Introduction
The recent history of bank regulation may be divided into four
phases. In the first phase, which in some countries lasted only
until the early 70’s while for others until the mid 80’s, bank reg-
ulation was mostly performed at the national level and was many
times very tight.1 During this phase interest rates (deposit and/or
lending) were often regulated, which had the negative side effect
of impairing competition and conceivably also innovation in the
banking sector. This and the increasing degree of internation-
alization, also of the capital markets, is likely to have been one
important motive inducing regulators to move to a second phase
where capital requirements on banks, ostensibly serving to deal
with credit risks, worked to reduce moral hazard problems. In
this phase, regulation also turned into an international matter,
often with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as coor-
dinator (and instigator), and thus we may date the beginning of
this phase to be in 1988, the year of the first Basel Accord.
The intentions behind moving to the third phase (the begin-
ning of which coincides with that of the second Basel accord in
2004) was to make regulation more flexible and to induce yet more
competition among banks. In this phase, at least for some banks,
regulation would not take place by means of standardized capi-
tal requirements, but be based on the banks’ own risk analysis
tools with a consequent potential for making regulation more cost
efficient. The implementation of the second Basel accord was in-
terrupted by the 2008 financial crisis which led to the formulation
of yet another accord, the third Basel Accord (2010-2011). This
fourth phase of bank regulation is characterized by a tightening
of control and supervision, exemplified by an increase in capital
ratio requirements and a reversal to more objective standards for
defining the risk structure of the individual bank’s assets.
1See Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Kaminsky and Schmukler
(2003) for studies of the date of the unset of financial liberalization in various
countries.
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Noticeably absent from the third Basel accord, however, is any
attempt to return to regulating deposit/lending interest rates.2
Rather the intention seems to have been to sharpen the tool of
capital requirement to make it adequate for an international scene
of increased financial sophistication, innovation and competition.
The rationale one may conjecture from this approach is that reg-
ulators agree that competition among banks has brought consid-
erable benefits to the world economy and reversing to a regime
with price controls would be a too costly way of avoiding the kind
of excessive risk-taking by banks (and other financial institutions)
that undoubtedly was one of the main causes of the near collapse
of financial markets witnessed in late 2008.
The view that interest rate control is not an attractive regula-
tory instrument and that competition among financial institutions
is overall beneficial to the general economy is far from equivocally
supported by economists. One of the main theoretical arguments
against it is that increased competition and in particular the abil-
ity to freely set interest rates tend to erode the franchise values of
the individual bank which in turn leads to increased risk taking
by banks. A prominent and often cited theoretical contribution is
that of Hellman et. al. (2000), henceforth HMS. These authors
argue that while pure deposit rate control regulation is Pareto op-
timal this is never so for pure capital requirements regulation: cap-
ital requirements can only be Pareto optimal in conjunction with
deposit rate control - in fact they interprete their main Proposi-
tion as stating that ”... the current policy regime practiced in most
countries around the world (i.e. using just a capital requirement
with no deposit-rate control) is a Pareto-inferior policy choice”
(Repullo 2004, p. 156).
The model of HMS is essentially partial equilibrium and as
Repullo (2004) showed, some of their results do not necessarily
2Some aspects of regulations implemented or in the process of being im-
plemented do resemble aspects of earlier regulatory regimes. In particular
laws that limit the scope of banks’ activities (similar to ”narrow banking”)
have been introduced (in the US) or are being discussed (by The Independent
Commission on Banking in the UK).
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hold in a general equilibrium context.3 In fact Repullo (2004) can
be seen as essentially an investigation into the soundness of some
of the conclusions of HMS, using a full general equilibrium model
(the Salop model of monopolistic competition).4 Repullo only
compares pure deposit rate control and pure capital requirements
regimes, but does to some extend support the conclusion of HMS
by finding that the former is effective whenever the latter is while
the opposite does not hold (Hellman et al 2000, p. 175).
As is acknowledged by Repullo, his model suffers from some
shortcomings, in particular that aggregate demand for bank de-
posits is fixed (independent from the deposit rate offered by the
bank) - a shortcoming that, since we use Repullo’s model, is also
present in our study. However, it is worth noticing that this short-
coming is unlikely to work in favor of deposit rate control, since it
ignores the financial repression that may be the outcome of keep-
ing the deposit rate low.
In the absence of the possibility of financial repression or other
undesired effects of deposit rate control the conclusion of Repullo’s
model (and that of HMS) is in a certain sense foregone. This is
because there is a deadweight loss associated with using capital
requirements stemming from the (realistic) assumption that eq-
uity capital is costly (i.e. the opportunity cost of capital is higher
than the return on any investment the bank may undertake) while
there is no deadweight cost associated with deposit rate control
- it only shifts surplus from depositors to banks. Only because
there are distinct agents in the models of Repullo and HMS (the
ex-post and ex-ante identical banks, the (typical) depositor and
3In Repullo’s model (as in ours) an increase in the capital requirements does
not erode the franchise value of the banks since it is fully born by depositors. In
our model with free entry this would hold even if supply of deposit was elastic.
Repullo also shows the existence of a non-binding Pareto optimal deposit rate
control as we also do.
4Repullo(2004) also briefly studies another regulatory option, that of risk-
based capital requirements and finds it to be superior to the others. However,
he does not formalize the issue of how the regulator can get to know the
riskiness of an individual bank’s asset portfolio.
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(in HMS) the government, who is paying for deposit insurance)
who benefit in different ways from regulation, does this funda-
mental difference between the two regulatory regimes not become
decisive in ranking them. Here we ask whether there are possible
negative consequences of a reduced level of competition stemming
from deposit rate control that may be captured in a model in the
tradition of HMS and Repullo (2004). Apart from the issue of
financial repression, the most obvious answer relates to efficiency
and innovation: one would expect that, if the tendency to in-
creased risk taking could be checked, increased competition would
lead to efficiency gains and to an improved offer of services - gains
that the last Basel accord is probably trying to preserve.
Our analysis takes off from the observation that the removal
of deposit rate controls was followed by a wave of consolidations
in the banking sector.5 Numerous studies show that during the
80’s and 90’s, after the liberalization of financial markets, there
was a noticeable reduction in the number of banks which seems
paradoxical since this would normally be taken to indicate a re-
duction in the level of competition.6 Another stylized fact is that
transfers from regimes with interest rate control to regimes with
capital control seem to have been accompanied with an increase in
the real rate offered to depositors. This indicates that the ceiling
imposed on interest rates was binding. Since a non-binding ceiling
is not costly (in terms of the number of banks) and hence to be
preferred if feasible, this and the aforementioned (and probably
not unrelated) consolidation of the banking sector indicate that
5There were other important factors that contributed to this consolidation
and we shall not attempt to establish here which were the more important
ones.
6Schildbach(2008) reports a 28% reduction in the number of banks in West-
ern Europe from 1997 to 2006, Fiorentino et al.(2008) report a reduction in
the number of banks in Germany of 54% and in Italy of 26% over the period
1990-2005, while Altunbas¸, Y. and D. Marque´s (2008) report a reduction of
US bank to the tune of 50% over the period 1980 - 2003. See also Goddard
et al.(2007) for country by country data for Europe that, with the exception
of Greece, Ireland and Netherlands confirm this trend for the period 1985 –
2004.
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controlling the deposit rate was costly and that there may have
been savings associated with transferring to a regime with capital
control.
We formalize the idea that in the presence of deposit rate con-
trol, leading to higher profits for banks shielded from competi-
tion, an excessive number of banks would be established at a cost
to society at large. Taking this into account a real, fundamental
trade-off between the two regimes appears: capital requirements
are costly because outside capital is costly while deposit rate con-
trol is costly because it leads to a bloated banking sector (and it
is costly to set up banks).
To formalize this idea we make only one change to Repullo’s
model: assuming free entry, that is, that the number of banks is
endogenous (determined by a zero expected profit condition), and
that establishing a bank is costly.7 Together with the assumption
that depositors pay for deposit insurance via taxes, this assump-
tion leads to a simplification of the welfare analysis: banks make
zero profit in equilibrium and to compare the different regulatory
regimes we only need to compare the welfare of the (average) de-
positor.
As in Repullo (2004) we essentially only compare a pure de-
posit rate control regime with a pure capital requirement regime.
Unlike Repullo we confine our attention to the following question:
which regime is optimal (i.e. we ask which regime a government,
seeking to maximize welfare, would implement). We find that,
depending on parameters, whenever regulation is called for, there
are three possibilities: that deposit rate control with a non-binding
ceiling is effective which is then optimal, that deposit rate control
with a binding ceiling is optimal and that binding capital require-
ments are optimal. The latter possibility means that there are
7An early contribution by Gehrig(1995) also studies the welfare conse-
quences of free (and restricted) entry, however in a model quite different from
ours: the model does not consider moral hazard issues and has only one pe-
riod. On the other hand the model has a more satisfactory description of
competition among banks than ours since banks compete both for borrowers
and depositors.
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circumstances under which deposit-rate control is not Pareto op-
timal (a possibility that was excluded in HMS).
In Section 2 we present the model which is essentially the same
as that of Repullo (2004) and define the first-best outcome. In
Section 3 we consider capital requirements on the banks and show
that in the model such requirements may be Pareto improving over
no regulation while in Section 4 we do the same for deposit rate
control. Finally, in Section 5, we compare the two regimes and
show that, depending on parameters, any of them may dominate
in terms of welfare. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model and first-best benchmark
There are only three differences between our model and that of
Repullo (2004): we assume that the number of banks is determined
by free entry and a zero profit condition, that it is costly to set
up a bank and that each depositor has an amount D to deposit
(potentially, an extra parameter in our study). We also pay closer
attention to participation in the credit market by introducing a
constraint that all potential depositors actually are customers with
some bank.
In this infinite-horizon model there is at each date a contin-
uum of potential risk neutral bank consumers, identical except for
where they are placed on the unit circle, each desiring to place a
deposit D for one period.8 These agents live for two periods, sav-
ing when young and consuming when old, and at each date a new
identical generation enters. We shall assume that these consumers
do not have any storage technology available, implying that they,
barring transportation costs, are willing to accept any (expected)
net interest rate which is ≥ −1. As in many models of bank reg-
8As is usual with the Salop model, the distance between banks can be
interpreted literally or as indicating differences in the product mix and services
offered. See Cerqueiro et. al. (2007) for a study of how the localization of
banks intersect with the services offered and how consolidation has effected
these.
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ulation, the existence of deposit insurance implies that depositors
only care about the interest rate offered by the bank. As in Re-
pullo, the unit cost of ”walking to the bank” is μ, where this cost
can best be interpreted as a cost of having to buy a product which
is some ”distance” away from the ideal product.
In this monopolistic competition model entrance of banks, at a
cost C, is endogenous and takes place if and only if expected profit
is positive. The resulting n banks, placing themselves uniformly
on the unit circle, each have zero expected profit.9 As in HMS
and Repullo (2004), in each period banks choose to invest the
deposits received in either a prudent asset, yielding a net return
α > 0 with probability 1, or a gambling asset which has return net
returns γ > α with probability 1−π and β > −1 with probability
π. They will not invest in both assets. Since, by assumption,
α > (1 − π)γ + πβ, from the point of view of society the prudent
asset is the desirable one. This assumption can also be written as
π > π :=
γ − α
γ − β (1)
As in Repullo (2004), the (opportunity) cost of outside capital is
ρ > α for the banks, and this rate is then also used to discount
future profits.
Timing, inside each period, thus is as follows: first potential
banks decide to enter or not, secondly, with the number n of banks
being given, a symmetric, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
terms of investment choice and deposit rate (possibly restricted)
is reached. In the first period, t = 1, this is the game being
played. At date t > 1, if a bank is declared bankrupt, a new bank
immediately replaces it. In the second stage at date t, n is taken
as given and the game is as the second stage at date 1.
The demand function for deposits of bank j with n banks in
the market is derived following Repullo closely. If all other banks
offer the (net) interest rate r and bank j offers rj, a depositor at
a distance z from bank j and thus at a distance 1n − z from the
9We simplify the analysis by allowing that n ∈ R+ rather than n ∈ N
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other nearest bank will be indifferent between these two banks if
Drj − μz = Dr − μ( 1
n
− z)
In other words, bank j will attract all depositors within a distance
of
z =
1
2n
+
rj − r
2μ
D
meaning, since each depositor will place a deposit equal to D, that
its total demand will be
D(rj , r, n) =
1
n
D +
rj − r
μ
D2 (2)
Remark 1. Participation. The reasoning above, and thus the
demand function, is only correct when there is full participation
with the interest rate r (and with banks symmetrically placed on
the circle). We shall below impose this full participation condi-
tion in equilibrium. A bank offering an interest rate rj lower than
r may not capture depositors whose participation constraint be-
comes binding. Suppose for example that (1 + r)D = μ2n so that
the depositor in the middle between the two banks is exactly indif-
ferent between participating or not. If bank 1 lowers the interest
rate to rj, according to our reasoning the depositor located at a
distance z′ = 12n +
rj−r
2μ D is indifferent between which bank to
use. But this depositor will not want to use bank 2 (that kept the
interest rate at r) and hence not bank 1 either. Formally we have
that the transportation cost to bank 1 is
μ(
1
2n
+
rj − r
2μ
D) =
μ
2n
+
D(1 + rj)−D(1 + r)
2
=
μ
2n +D(1 + rj)
2
> D(1 + rj)
so that the depositor located at distance z′ from bank 1 prefers
not to walk to this bank. 
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First Best
It may be illuminating to calculate the first best outcome: here
D is invested in the safe asset, i.e. the (net) return is Dα at each
date, and the number of banks is set to maximize average welfare.
We assume investment can only take place through banks. Notice
that in our model banks always have zero expected profit and the
relevant measure of welfare is the expected welfare of the average
(over the circle) depositor.
From this should be deducted the transportation costs (de-
pending on n) and the set-up cost nρC for this optimal n (where
we are using the banks’ discount rate, i.e. we assume that they
have to borrow at rate ρ, but are compensated by consumers),
which, because we are looking at the unit circle, is also the aver-
age set-up cost per depositor.
Transportation Costs with n banks
With n banks there are n sections (bordered by two banks), each
having a distance of 1n . The consumer in the middle of that
section has the longest distance to a bank: 12n . Recalling that
this consumer will only walk to the bank if his return satisfies
(1+ r)D > μ2n , and considering that bank profits Dα−Dr−nρC
are zero and set-up costs are shifted to consumers, yields the con-
straint
(1 + α)D > nρC +
μ
2n
(3)
This puts some restrictions on the parameters of the model.10 We
shall choose our parameters such that (3) is fulfilled.
The aggregate transportation costs for the consumers in any
section is
10These restrictions are not explicitly considered in Repullo(2004). Note
that if the agents have a storage technology, the participation constraint be-
comes αD > nCρ + μ
2n
. We are assuming that only consumers who use the
bank pay for the set-up costs.
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2μ
∫ 1
2n
0
mdm = 2μ
[
1
2
m2
] 1
2n
0
=
1
4
μ
n2
Thus average (which is also the aggregate) transportation costs
for the unit circle is n14
μ
n2
= 14
μ
n .
To maximize average welfare and ignoring for now (3) we there-
fore have to maximize
(1 + α)D − μ
4n
− nρC
i.e. minimize μ4n + nρC, i.e. the optimal number of banks is
n∗ = 12
√
μ
ρC . Now taking into account constraint (3) we require
(1 + α)D > n∗ρC + μ2n∗ .
The first-best average welfare of the consumers is (per period):
W ∗ = (1 + α)D − μ4n∗ − n∗ρC = (1 + α)D − 14 μ1
2
√
μ
ρC
− 12
√
μ
ρC ρC
= (1 + α)D − 12
√
μρC − 12
√
μρC = (1 + α)D −√μρC
For convenience we shall first study the model when capital re-
quirements are imposed and then, in Section 4, study the model
with interest rate control.
3 Capital requirements
We now consider the case where banks are required to have a
capitalization equal to k ≥ 0 times total deposits. Like Repullo
we shall only study symmetric equilibria where either all banks use
the prudent asset or all banks use the gambling asset. Suppose
first the prudent asset is being used by all banks in the second
stage and that all depositors on the unit circle use some bank.
Then for a given number n of banks, the present value of being
in the market is (see Appendix 2 or Repullo, 2004): VP (n) =
μ
ρn2
.
Setting this value equal to C and solving for n, we get
13
nP =
√
μ
ρC
(4)
which is always larger than n∗ = 12nP , i.e. there are always too
many banks in a prudent equilibrium. Also notice that nP does
neither depend on k nor on D. Essentially, the cost of the capital
requirement is passed on to depositors and hence does not affect
the present value, VP (n). When it comes to D, there are two
opposite effects which exactly cancel out each other. Firstly, a
higher D leads to greater competition since depositors are willing
to travel longer. This will affect the value of being operating a
bank negatively. Secondly, a higher D leads to a higher profit per
depositor.
With this number determined, and continuing to assume that
all depositors use some bank, the equilibrium deposit rate in a
prudent equilibrium is (again, see Appendix 2 or Repullo, 2004,
for details):
rP (k, nP ) = α− μ
nPD
− (ρ− α)k (5)
Similarly, if the gambling asset is being used by all banks (and
all potential depositors participate), the present value of a gam-
bling bank is VG(n) =
(1−π)μ
(ρ+π)n2 (see Appendix 2 or Repullo, 2004)
when there are n banks.11
With free entry, the number of banks, nG, then solves VG(n) =
(1−π)μ
(ρ+π)n2 = C, i.e.
nG (π) =
√
(1− π)μ
(ρ+ π)C
(6)
11The present value formula assumes that gambling banks are bankrupt in
the bad state. Notice that if this were not so, a bank would get a higher
profit form investing in the prudent asset rather than in the gambling asset
(see Appendix 2 for more details).
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which again does not depend on k. To understand the relationship
between n∗ and nG note that√
1− π
ρ+ π
=
1
2
√
ρ
⇔ 4ρ (1− π) = ρ+ π ⇔ π = 3ρ
1 + 4ρ
i.e. there could be some π ∈ (0, 1) and ρ such that nG = n∗. Note
that since 1−πρ+π <
1
ρ , nG < nP always. We shall throughout assume
nG ≥ 2, i.e. (1−π)μ(ρ+π)C ≥ 4 which we write
π ≤
1− 4Cμ ρ
1 + 4Cμ
=: πG < 1 (7)
so that there are always at least two banks, whether we are in the
prudent or in the gambling equilibrium.
The equilibrium deposit rate in the gambling equilibrium is
then (see Appendix 2)
rG(k, nG) = γ − μ
nGD
− [ 1 + ρ
1− π − (1 + γ)]k (8)
Full participation
We shall only study equilibria with full participation. All deposi-
tors participate if the depositor in the middle between two banks
uses the bank. In the prudent equilibrium this is the case if:
(1 + rP (k, nP ))D ≥ μ
2nP
(9)
which, for k = 0, is equivalent to
(1 + α)D ≥ 3
2
√
μρC (10)
while for the gambling equilibrium we require
(1 + rG(k, nG))D ≥ μ
2nG
(11)
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which, for k = 0, is equivalent to
(1 + γ)D ≥ 3
2
√
μ(π + ρ)C
1− π (12)
In the latter requirement we have taken deposit insurance into
account. Assuming that the tax paid to cover deposit insurance
is independent of whether a potential depositor uses the banks
or not the cost of this insurance is exogenous to any individual
depositor.
Letting, with δP := ρ − α, δG := 1+ρ1−π − (1 + γ) ( so that
δG − δP > 0) and h :=
√
ρ+π
(1−π)ρ > 1,
mP (k) :=
γ − α− (δG − δP )k
2(h − 1) (13)
and
mG(k) := hmP (k)
this thus leads to the following definition (see Appendix 2 for ex-
planations).12
Definition 1. An equilibrium with full participation, for k given,
is a pair (n, r) ∈ R2 s.t. either (i) n = nP ≥ 2, μnP ≥ mP (k)D,
r = rP (k, nP ) and (9) holds, or (ii) n = nG ≥ 2, μnG ≤ mG(k)D,
r = rG(k, nG) and (11) holds.
Lemma 1.
μ
nP
= mP (k)D ⇔ μnG = mG(k)D.
Proof:
μ√
μ
ρC
= mP (k)D ⇔ μ√
μ
C
√
ρ
√
ρ+ π
(1− π) ρ =
√
ρ+ π
(1− π) ρmP (k)D
12δG − δP > 0 follows since α− γ +
1+ρ
1−π
− (1 + ρ) = α− γ + (1 + ρ) π
1−π
>
α − γ + (1 + ρ) γ−α
α−β
(since π ≥ π (γ, α, β)) where the final expression is > 0
because 1+ρ
α−β
> 1.
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⇔ μ√
μ
C
√
1−π
ρ+π
= hmP (k)D ⇔ μ
nG
= mG(k)D 
Note that since mP (k) (and hence mG(k)) is strictly decreasing
in k, there is exactly one k˜ so that μnP = mP (k˜)D (and hence
μ
nG
= mG(k˜)D). In fact, from (13)
k˜(π) =
μ
nP
2(h− 1) 1D − (γ − α)
δP − δG =
√
μρC
D 2
[√
ρ+π
(1−π)ρ − 1
]
− (γ − α)
ρ− α− 1+ρ1−π + (1 + γ)
(14)
This is the only value for which both equilibria exist simultane-
ously. For k < k˜ we have μnG < mG(k) and hence a gambling
equilibrium, while for k > k˜, μnP > mP (k) gives us a prudent
equilibrium.
mG (k)D
mP (k)D
μ/nG
μ/nP
k˜0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 k
R
Fig. 1: Determination of k˜
In the above Figure, which is similar to Fig. 1 of Repullo (2004),
we superimpose two horizontal lines, one at μnG and one at
μ
nP
. The
first line meets the graph ofmG(k)D at k˜ and the second line meets
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the graph of mP (k)D at k˜ as well. To the left of k˜, mG(k)D >
μ
nG
and mP (k)D >
μ
nP
while to the right of k˜, mG(k)D <
μ
nG
and
mP (k)D <
μ
nP
. This is the essence of the lemma.
Analysis of k˜.
Notice that the denominator δP−δG of k˜ is decreasing in π, positive
for π = 0 and negative for π ≥ π. Thus its zero at π˜∞, where π˜∞
satisfies ρ− α− 1+ρ1−π + (1 + γ) = 0, i.e.
π˜∞ = 1− 1 + ρ
1 + ρ+ γ − α
is such that π˜∞ < π.
Next consider the numerator of k˜, as given on the RHS of
(14). It needs to be negative as well for k˜ to be positive. Since
d
dπ
√
ρ+π
(1−π)ρ > 0 (with
√
ρ+π
(1−π)ρ = ∞ at π = 1), it is strictly
increasing in π and, since at π = 0 it is α−γ < 0, there is a unique
π˜0 such that it is zero. Thus for π > max{π˜∞, π˜0}, k˜(π) < 0, and
the only equilibrium is the prudent one. If π < π˜0, then there
is a region where k˜(π) > 0; moreover, it has a positive vertical
asymptote at π˜∞.
Solving for π˜0 (14) yields
2
√
μρC
D
[√
ρ+ π
(1− π)ρ − 1
]
− (γ − α) = 0
⇔
ρ+ π
(1− π)ρ =
[
γ − α
2
D√
μρC
+ 1
]2
⇔
ρ+ π =
[
γ − α
2
D√
μρC
+ 1
]2
(1− π)ρ
⇔
π
{
1 +
[
γ − α
2
D√
μρC
+ 1
]2
ρ
}
=
{[
γ − α
2
D√
μρC
+ 1
]2
− 1
}
ρ
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implying that
π˜0 =
(
γ−α
2
D√
μρC
+ 1
)2
− 1(
γ−α
2
D√
μρC
+ 1
)2
+ 1ρ
< 1 (15)
Notice that π˜0 = 0 for D = 0, ∂π˜0/∂C < 0, ∂π˜0/∂D > 0 and
π˜0 → 1 when C becomes small and/or D becomes large. This
implies the following
Lemma 2. There exist C0 > 0 and D0 > 0 such that, for all
C < C0 and D > D0, π˜0 > π˜∞. Then on the interval (π˜∞, π˜0)
k˜ (π) is positive and strictly decreasing in π with k˜ (π) ↑ ∞ for
π ↓ π˜∞ and k˜ (π˜0) = 0.
Proof: There only remains to show that the derivative of k˜ (π)
with respect to π is negative on (π˜∞, π˜0). To this end write k˜ (π)
from (14) as f(π)/g(π). Then ddπ (− 1+ρ1−π ) < 0 implies that
dk˜
dπ
=
2
√
μρC
D
d
dπ (
√
ρ+π
1−π )g(π) − ddπ (− 1+ρ1−π )f(π)
g2(π)
is negative when f(π) ≤ 0, i.e. on [0, π˜0]. 
Existence of full participation equilibrium for k = 0.
Proposition 1. There are parameter values such that π < πG(C).
In that case there exists D such that for D ≥ D and for all π ∈
[π, πG] there is a full participation equilibrium when k = 0.
Proof: Since π < 1 and πG → 1 when C/μ → 0 (see (7)), the
claimed parameter values exist. Next, it is sufficient to show ex-
istence of a gambling equilibrium. Now for π = πG, (12) holds
for D sufficiently large and thus for any π in the interval [π, πG].
Furthermore, mG(0) attains as a function of π a positive minimum
m on [π, πG] . For large D then
μ
nG
≤ mD ≤ mG(0)D. 
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Equilibrium Welfare
When calculating equilibrium welfare, we should bear in mind that
strictly speaking this only makes sense when there are at least two
banks.
Prudent Equilibrium
The average (per period) welfare of the consumer in the prudent
equilibrium, with capital requirements k, is
WP,π (k) = (1 + α) (1 + k)D − μ
4
√
μ
Cρ
− ρ
√
μ
Cρ
C − (1 + ρ)kD
= [(1 + α) + (α− ρ)k]D − 5
4
√
μρC (16)
To compare this with W ∗, rewrite WP as
WP (k, π) = (1 + α)D + (α− ρ)kD −
(
5
4
− 1 + 1
)√
μρC
= (1 + α)D −
√
μρC + (α− ρ)kD − 1
4
√
μρC
= W ∗ − (ρ− α)kD − 1
4
√
μρC
This shows that the efficiency loss in the prudent equilibrium is
due to two factors: the cost of capital and the cost of having too
many banks. In Appendix 2 we show that there is another way to
compute the welfare in the prudent equilibrium, namely by looking
at the return of the average consumer.
Gambling Equilibrium
At the end of any period, with probability 1−π, ρC has to be paid
as interest on the loan, and with probability π (i.e. in case of low
outcome) interest as well as the principal has to be paid. Thus
expected payment is (1− π)ρC + π(1 + ρ)C = (ρ+ π)C. Then
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WG = (1 + (1− π) γ + πβ) (1 + k)D
− μ
4nG
− nG (ρ+ π)C − (1 + ρ)kD (17)
= [1 + (1− π)γ + πβ]D + [(1− π)γ + πβ − ρ]kD
−1
4
√
μC
√
ρ+ π
1− π −
[√
(1− π)(ρ+ π)
√
μC
]
= [1 + (1− π)γ + πβ]D + [(1− π)γ + πβ − ρ]kD
−
√
μC(ρ+ π)
1− π
(
1
4
+ 1− π
)
= [1 + (1− π)γ + πβ]D + [(1− π)γ + πβ − ρ]kD
−
√
μC(ρ+ π)
1− π
(
5
4
− π
)
= : WG (k, π)
As we did with WP , in Appendix 2 we also show, as a consistency
check, for WG that it equals the return of the average consumer.
As we already noted, nG, the number of banks in a gambling
equilibrium, may be closer to the optimal number of banks than
is nP , the number of banks in a prudent equilibrium. This advan-
tage should be compared with the disadvantage of a lower return
and the cost of establishing new banks after existing banks go
bankrupt. The following lemma clarifies the comparison.
Lemma 3. Assume ρ ≤ 1. Then WG(0, π) ≤ WP (0) for all π ≥ π.
Proof: Since α ≥ (1 − π)γ + πβ for π ≥ π, it is sufficient to
show that 54
√
μρC ≤
√
μC(ρ+π)
1−π
(
5
4 − π
)
which, after squaring both
sides, multiplying by 1− π and rearranging can be written as
π
(
π2 − 5
2
π +
25
16
)
+ ρ
(
π2 − 15
16
π
)
≥ 0 (18)
π2 − 52π + 2516 has its minimum at π = 5/4 with value zero while
π2 − 1516π is negative on (0, 15/16), non-negative elsewhere. It is
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thus clear that if (18) holds for all π ∈ [0, 1] and ρ = 1 it does so
for all π ∈ [0, 1] and ρ ≤ 1, too. Inserting ρ = 1 in the LHS of (18)
we get π
(
π2 − 32π + 58
)
. π2 − 32π+ 58 has its minimum at π = 3/4
with value 1/16 > 0. We conclude that (18) holds for all π ∈ [π, 1]
and ρ ∈ [0, 1] . 
We are interested in comparing welfare in the gambling equi-
librium when k = 0 and welfare in the prudent equilibrium with k
positive, in particular, in finding k̂(π) such that the two are equal.
Thus k̂(π) solves WP (k) − WG (0, π) = 0 where WP (k) is given
by (16) and WG (0, π) by
WG (0, π) = [1 + (1− π)γ + πβ]D −
√
(ρ+ π)μC
1− π (
5
4
− π) (19)
This yields
k̂(π) =
α− (1− π)γ − πβ
ρ− α +
√
μC
(ρ− α)D
[√
ρ+ π
1− π (
5
4
− π)− 5
4
√
ρ
]
(20)
We summarize its properties in the following
Lemma 4. Assume ρ < 1. Then for all D > 0 the following holds:
(i) k̂(π) is strictly increasing in π; (ii) k̂(0) = (α− γ) / (ρ− α) <
0 and limπ→1 k̂(π) = ∞; (iii) there exists a unique π̂0 such that
k̂ (π̂0) = 0. Moreover, π̂0 < π.
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
We now ask if there are conditions under which capital control is
meaningful. This gives rise to the following
Definition 2 Meaningful regulation. We say that regulation is
meaningful when α, β, γ, μ, π, ρ, C and D fulfil the following pa-
rameter requirements:
(i) γ > α > β, ρ > α.
(ii) π ≥ π.
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(iii) k˜(π) > 0, i.e. π < π˜0; so without capital requirements the
gambling equilibrium will prevail (assuming at least two banks and
full participation), thus giving a reason to impose capital require-
ments.
(iv) π ≤ πG; so there will be at least 2 banks in the gambling
equilibrium, hence in the prudent equilibrium.
(v) (1+rP (k˜(π), nP ))D ≥ μ2nP ; so that if we impose the capital re-
quirement, the full participation requirement (9) that we imposed
earlier holds. Notice that we do not exclude rP < 0!
(vi) (1 + rG(0, nG))D ≥ μ2nG , the full participation requirement
(12) we imposed earlier.
(vii) WG(0, π) ≤ WP (k˜(π)); so that it actually make sense, in
terms of welfare for the agents, to impose capital requirements.
The condition holds if k̂(π) ≥ k˜(π).
Remark 2. Participation
In defining the optimal strategy of a potential deviator we ig-
nore possible participation constraints on parts of the depositors,
meaning that we only provide sufficient conditions for existence
of prudent respectively gambling equilibria. However in Proposi-
tion 2 below we consider large D. It is easy to show that, in the
equilibria we consider, large D, holding all other parameter values
fixed, means that the participation constraint will not bind for any
deviator.
Proposition 2. There are α, β, γ, ρ, μ, C > 0, D > 0 and an open
interval I ⊂ [0, 1] s.t. for C ≤ C, D > D and π ∈ I all parameter
requirements are fulfilled.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Note that in the proof of this proposition all parameter values can
be locally varied without invalidating the relations established.
This means that there is an open ball (set) in the parameter space
s.t. all parameter requirements are fulfilled.
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Example 1. Consider the following parameter values: α = 0.06,
β = −0.1, γ = ρ = 0.1, μ = 1, C = 0.025 and D = 10. Then
the δ in (42) (see Appendix 1) is 2.5 so that condition (40) is
satisfied, and we obtain π˜∞ = 0.035088 < π̂0 = 0.1817 < π =
0.2 < π∗ = 0.20503 < π˜0 = 0.68571 < πG = 0.9, and thus I =
(0.20503, 0.68571) . These values are illustrated in Figure 2. The
decreasing curve plots k˜ while the increasing one k̂. The part of
k˜ between π = 0.20503 (= π∗, the abscissa of the intersection
between the two curves) and π = 0.68571 (= π˜0, the intersection
of k˜ with the horizontal axes) depicts the set of prudent equilibria
(π, k) with a capital requirement k = k˜ (π) > 0 which are feasible
and preferable to gambling equilibria.
k̂
k˜
π˜0π∗
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0
0.05
0.10
π
k
Fig. 2: Meaningful capital requirement
The number of firms in a prudent equilibrium is nP = 20 while
the optimal number is n∗ = 10. The interest rate varies from
rP (k
∗, 20) = 0.050008, where k∗ = k˜ (π∗) = 0.12479, to rP (0, 20) =
0.055, where 0 = k˜ (π˜0) . Regarding welfare, it varies fromWP (k
∗) =
10.488 to WP (0) = 10.538 while the optimum welfare is W
∗ =
10.55.
For pairs (π, k) with π∗ < π < π˜0 and k < k˜ (π) gambling
equilibria occur. However, they are all welfare-dominated by cor-
responding prudent equilibria
(
π, k˜ (π)
)
. In particular, welfare in
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the gambling equilibria (π, 0) varies from WG(0, π
∗) = 10.488 to
WG(0, π˜0) = 9.4875. The number of firms varies from nG = 10.21
for π = π∗ to nG = 4 for π = π˜0 while the interest rate varies from
rG(0, 10.21) = 0.090206 to rG(0, 4) = 0.075.
Note that there is an interval of admissible π’s, namely [π, π∗),
in which WG(0, π) > WP
(
k˜ (π)
)
, i.e. the gambling equilibrium
is welfare-superior to the prudent equilibrium with capital con-
trol, in spite of the fact that the gambling asset has an expected
return (1 − π)γ + πβ < α, i.e. smaller than the return of the
safe asset. This is so because WG(0, π
∗) = WP
(
k˜ (π∗)
)
and
WG(0, π) − WP
(
k˜ (π)
)
is decreasing in π. The reason for this
is that the number of firms in a gambling equilibrium is much
closer to the first-best number than the one in the prudent equi-
librium. This underlines the importance of letting the number of
firms be an endogenous variable rather than an exogenous one as
in Hellman et.al. (1997) and Repullo (2004).
Finally, it is easy to check that the participation constraints
(v) and (vi) are by large margins satisfied.
4 Deposit rate control
Interest control, i.e. ceilings on deposit interest rates, may po-
tentially induce banks to invest in the prudent asset because this
allows them to reap the benefit of the low deposit interest rates for
a longer period. As we shall assume that banks are free to enter
the market the increased prospective profit resulting from interest
rate ceilings may lead to more banks entering the market. Thus
the cost of the interest rate ceiling is higher total set-up costs (with
capital requirement the cost derives from the opportunity costs of
capital put up by the banks). Obviously, there may be other costs
associated with interest rate control, namely the reduced incen-
tives to innovate when it is not possible to capture market shares
by offering better rates than competitors. Our model does not
capture such costs however.
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The set-up cost for a bank is C. The n banks are placed
symmetrically on the circle, i.e. for any bank the distance to any
of its neighbors is the same as that of any other bank.
The game being played is as follows:
Date 0: The deposit rate ceiling is determined by the regulator.
At date t ≥ 1 the game is as outlined in section 2.1.
In the following analysis we shall initially ignore participation
constraints. Later in this section, we shall present parameter con-
ditions that justify this.
In a prudent equilibrium with an interest ceiling r and n banks,
the interest being offered isRP (r) = min{r, rP (0, n)} = min{r, α−
μ
nD}. The value of being in the market in a prudent equilibrium
with n banks is VP where
VP =
1
1 + ρ
[α−RP (r)]D
n
+
1
1 + ρ
VP
So VP = (α − r) Dρn if RP (r) = r and VP = μnD Dρn if RP (r) = rP .
This means that the present value is
VP = max
{
μ
ρn2
,
α− r
ρn
D
}
With this value determined we can find the number of banks,
nP (r), namely that n that solves VP = C. If r ≤ rP , this equation
becomes α−rρn D = C, i.e.
nP (r) =
α− r
ρC
D (21)
In the other case nP (r) = nP =
√
μ
ρC . We conclude that
nP (r) = max
{√
μ
ρC
,
α− r
ρC
D
}
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Notice that there will always be at least as many banks in a pru-
dent equilibrium with interest rate control as in a prudent equi-
librium with capital control.
We next turn to finding the number of banks in a gambling
equilibrium with interest rate control. Here, with n banks, RG(r) =
min{r, γ − μnD} and the value of being in the market is
VG =
1− π
1 + ρ
[γ −RG(r)]D
n
+
1− π
1 + ρ
VG
so that VG = [γ − r]Dn 1−ππ+ρ if r ≤ rG, μn2 1−ππ+ρ else. Thus,
VG = max
{
μ
n2
1− π
π + ρ
, [γ − r]D
n
1− π
π + ρ
}
As for the case of the prudent equilibrium, we find the number of
banks in the gambling equilibrium with interest rate control to be
the n s.t. VG = C, that is, if r ≤ rG we solve 1−ππ+ρ γ−rn D = C, i.e.
nG(r) =
1−π
π+ρ
γ−r
C D, and else nG(r) =
√
1−π
π+ρ
μ
C . Thus
nG(r) = max
{√
1− π
π + ρ
μ
C
,
1− π
π + ρ
γ − r
C
D
}
Existence of a prudent equilibrium
There are three potential deviations from a symmetric Nash equi-
librium in which all the nP (r) banks use the prudent asset and
charge the interest rate RP (r) = min{r, α − μnPD} = min{r, α −√
μρC
D }:
(i) A bank already in the market charges another interest rate but
continues to use the prudent asset.
(ii) A bank already in the market uses the gambling asset instead
of the prudent asset and charges another interest rate.
(iii) A bank decides to enter the market, using either the prudent
or the gambling asset.
In finding nP (r) above we ruled out deviations of type (i). Note
that deviations of type (iii) will not be profitable, if deviations of
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type (i) and (ii) are not: with nP (r) banks in the market and at
fixed positions the new entrant would be facing more competition
than a deviating bank already in the market. Hence if charging
a different interest rate and or investing in the gambling asset is
not attractive for the latter, it is also not attractive for the former.
And using the prudent asset and charging the same interest rate as
those banks already in the market clearly would lead to negative
profits. We shall now turn to conditions that rule out deviations
of type (ii).
Given the interest rate RP (r) charged by all the other nP (r)−1
banks (using the prudent asset) and given r, a potential deviator
solves:
max
r≤r
1− π
1 + ρ
(γ − r)D(r,RP (r), nP (r)) + 1− π
1 + ρ
C
(recall that C is the present value of using the prudent asset and
D(·) the demand function for deposits, see (2)). If the value of
this problem is ≤ C it is not profitable to deviate and the prudent
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. The solution to this problem,
i.e. to
max
r≤r
(γ − r)
[
1
nP (r)
D +
r −RP (r)
μ
D2
]
is
min
{
r,
RP (r) + γ
2
− μ
2DnP (r)
}
(22)
We thus consider three cases:
(a) r < α−
√
μρC
D , so r is binding.
(b) α −
√
μρC
D ≤ r < 12
{
α+ γ − 2
√
μρC
D
}
≡ r∗ (where the upper
limit is found by setting RP (r) = rP = α −
√
μρC
D and nP (r) =
nP =
√
μ
ρC in
RP (r)+γ
2 − μ2DnP (r)). In this case the limit is only
binding for the potential deviator.
(c) r ≥ 12
{
α+ γ − 2
√
μρC
D
}
, so the limit is binding for no one.
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In case (a), since nP (r) =
α−r
ρC D >
√
μ
ρC , we have γ− μDnP (r) >
α − μ
D
√
μ
ρC
= α −
√
μρC
D > r, so min
{
r, RP (r)+γ2 − μ2DnP (r)
}
= r
and it is optimal for a potential deviator to set r = r. Inserting
this in the maximand we get: 1−π1+ρ
γ−r
α−rρC +
1−π
1+ρC which is ≤ C
if γ−rα−rρ ≤ ρ+π1−π . This means that for the existence of a prudent
equilibrium we require
r ≤ (ρ+ π)α− ρ(1− π)γ
π(1 + ρ)
≡ rP (23)
Repullo (2004, Prop. 3) found that independently of μ and n,
whenever the interest ceiling r is ≤ rP there is a prudent equilib-
rium which is parallel to the inequality we just established.
Remark 3. Analysis of rP
Recall the following restrictions: γ > α > (1 − π)γ + πβ,
0 ≤ α < ρ < 1 and β ≥ −1. Rewrite rP as ρ[α−γ(1−π)]+παπ(1+ρ) . Then,
since α − γ(1 − π) > πβ ≥ −π, rP > ρ(−π)+παπ(1+ρ) > −1+01+1 = −12 .
Notice that for ρ = 1, β = −1 and α = 0, rP = −12 when α =
(1− π)γ + πβ. Moreover, rP < ρ[α−α(1−π)]+παπ(1+ρ) = απρ+αππ(1+ρ) = α and
rP approaches α as γ, ρ and α approach 1. We conclude that
rP ∈ (−1
2
, α) 
Case (b): RP (r) = α−
√
μρC
D , nP (r) =
√
μ
ρC and the optimal r for
a potential deviator would be 12
{
α+ γ − 2
√
μρC
D
}
> r, that is the
potential deviator chooses r = r. The requirement for the non-
existence of a profitable deviation is (following a parallel reasoning
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to the one for capital requirements - see Appendix 3)13
(γ − r)
(
r − α
μ
D2 + 2
√
ρC
μ
D
)
≤ ρ+ π
1− πC
which can be rewritten as
−r2+
[
(γ + α)− 2
D
√
ρCμ
]
r−
[
αγ − 2γ
D
√
ρCμ+
ρ+ π
1− π
Cμ
D2
]
≤ 0
(24)
The maximum of the LHS of (24) is at r∗ > α− 1D
√
ρCμ. Let, for
the case where the maximum value is non-negative, r1 ≤ r∗ ≤ r2
be the solutions to the LHS of (24) being = 0. Thus if, for r =
α − 1D
√
ρCμ, the LHS of (24) is > 0 we have r1 < α − 1D
√
ρCμ
which implies that for α −
√
μρC
D ≤ r < 12
{
α+ γ − 2
√
μρC
D
}
the
LHS of (24) is> 0, i.e. a deviation pays, and a prudent equilibrium
does not exist.
If, on the other hand, for r = α− 1D
√
ρCμ the LHS of (24) is
≤ 0, we have either of the following cases:
- there is a prudent equilibrium for r ∈ (α − 1D
√
ρCμ, r1] (this is
the case when at r∗ the LHS of (24) is ≥ 0).
or
- there is a prudent equilibrium for r ∈ (α − 1D
√
ρCμ, r∗] (this is
the case when at r∗ the LHS of (24) is < 0 and corresponds to
the case where there is no need for regulation, since the bank will
always use the prudent asset - see also Appendix 4, Fact 2 ).
Inserting r = α − 1D
√
ρCμ in the LHS of (24) we get that for
a prudent equilibrium to exist we must have
− π(1 + ρ)
1− π
μC
D2
+
γ − α
D
√
ρCμ ≤ 0 (25)
We summarize in the following
13We require that the expected discounted profit from a one-shot deviation
is ≤ the expected discounted profit from no deviation (which is equal to C):
1−π
1+ρ
(
(γ − r)
(
r−α
μ
D2 + 2
√
ρC
μ
D
)
+ C
)
≤ C.
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Lemma 5. A necessary and sufficient condition for there to be a
non-binding interest rate ceiling that induces the prudent equilib-
rium is that (25) holds 
Remark 4. Suppose that
rP ≥ α− 1
D
√
ρCμ (26)
so that a prudent equilibrium with a binding interest rate ceiling
exists, ∀r ≤ α− 1D
√
ρCμ. Note then that since r = α− 1D
√
ρCμ is
also a non-binding ceiling, the condition for such an equilibrium to
exist, (25), holds as well. Thus (26) implies (25). In fact, condition
(25) is equivalent to π(1+ρ)1−π
√
μC
D ≥ (γ − α)
√
ρ while (26) says that
(ρ+π)α−ρ(1−π)γ
π(1+ρ) ≥ α− 1D
√
ρμC, which is equivalent to π(1+ρ)1−π
√
μC
D ≥
−ρα(1−π)+ρ(1−π)γ
1−π which is in turn equivalent to
π(1+ρ)
1−π
√
μC
D ≥ (γ−
α)
√
ρ. We therefore conclude that
rP < α−
√
ρμC
D
is equivalent to there being no prudent equilibrium with an interest
ceiling that is non-binding except for potential deviators. Notice
that this condition holds for D large. 
Case (c) where the interest rate ceiling is non-binding for all cor-
responds to the case we have studied in Section 3 with k = 0.
The possibility of a prudent equilibrium with binding and non-
binding interest ceiling will be illustrated in Panel (a), Figure 4,
Section 5.
Existence of gambling equilibrium
Existence of a gambling equilibrium with a binding interest ceiling
will not be of much relevance for our results, hence we do not
provide a full analysis here. Below we present the general picture
and in Appendix 3 we provide a few more details.
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Given r and the interest rate RG(r) charged by the nG(r) −
1 other banks (using the gambling asset), the potential deviator
considers the problem
max
r≤r
1
1 + ρ
(α− r)D(r,RG(r), nG(r)) + C
1 + ρ
where C is the present value of being in the gambling equilibrium.
If the value of this problem is ≤ C it does not pay to deviate
and the gambling equilibrium with interest rate ceiling r exists.
Using the definition (2) of the the demand function, the first-order
condition to the unconstrained problem is
−r −RG(r)
μ
D2 − D
nG(r)
+
α− r
μ
D2 = 0 ,
so the solution to the problem is
min
{
r,
RG(r) + α− μDnG(r)
2
}
For r ≤ γ − 1D
√
π+ρ
1−ρμC (from (8) and (6)), RG(r) = r, and
at r = γ − 1D
√
π+ρ
1−ρμC the solution to the deviator’s problem
is 12
{
γ + α− 2D
√
π+ρ
1−ρμC
}
which is ≤ γ − 1D
√
π+ρ
1−ρμC, so that
at this point the ceiling is not binding. We now find the point
(≤ γ − 1D
√
π+ρ
1−ρμC) at which the ceiling becomes binding for the
potential deviator, that is the solution to
r + α− μDnG(r)
2
= r
or, using that nG(r) =
1−π
π+ρ
γ−r
C D,
r + α− π+ρ1−π CμD2(γ−r)
2
= r
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which can be rewritten as
α− π + ρ
1− π
Cμ
D2 (γ − r) = r (27)
This equation holds iff
r2 − (γ + α)r +
(
αγ − π + ρ
1− π
Cμ
D2
)
= 0
The determinant of this quadratic equation, Δ = (γ + α)2 −
4
(
αγ − π+ρ1−π CμD2
)
= (γ−α)2+ π+ρ1−π CμD2 , is positive, so the solutions,
r1 =
γ + α
2
−
√
Δ/2 and r2 =
γ + α
2
+
√
Δ/2
are real. Notice that r2 >
γ+α
2 +
√
(γ−α)2
2 = γ > γ − 1D
√
π+ρ
1−ρμC
at which point r is no longer binding. As a consequence we divide
up into three cases:
Case (a): r < r1. The ceiling is binding for all, including the
potential deviator.
Case (b): r1 ≤ r < γ − 1D
√
π+ρ
1−ρμC. The ceiling is not binding for
a potential deviator, but for all others it is.
Case (c): r ≥ γ − 1D
√
π+ρ
1−ρμC. This case corresponds to the case
studied in Section 3 with k = 0.
5 Deposit rate control versus capital require-
ments
In this section we ask whether there are conditions under which
capital control leads to higher welfare than an interest rate ceil-
ing and vice versa. Before proceeding to this question we need
however to study in more detail the welfare of a gambling equilib-
rium. Because welfare is influenced not only by the overall return
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but also by the number of banks, it is not a priori the case that
a prudent equilibrium dominates, in terms of welfare, a gambling
equilibrium when there is a deposit rate ceiling. Thus in Proposi-
tion 2 we were careful to check that a gambling equilibrium with
k = 0 was actually dominated by a prudent equilibrium when
k was sufficiently large to make the prudent equilibrium imple-
mentable. Since the welfare of a gambling equilibrium is strictly
decreasing in k there was no need to check the welfare of a gam-
bling equilibrium with k > 0. However, in the case of an interest
rate ceiling, the cost of regulation is the total set-up cost, and we
are no longer ensured that the welfare of a gambling equilibrium
is maximized when there is no (binding) interest rate ceiling. We
turn to finding the optimal number of banks when the gambling
asset is being used, i.e. the solution to
max
n
γD − μ
4n
− n(ρ+ π)C
which is n∗G =
1
2
√
μ
(ρ+π)C < n
∗. When there is no interest rate ceil-
ing, the number of banks is nG(∞) =
√
(1−π)μ
(π+ρ)C , so if
√
1− π > 1/2
i.e. π ≤ 3/4, n∗G ≤ nG(∞). This condition is sufficient for wel-
fare in a gambling equilibrium without interest rate control to be
larger than welfare in any gambling equilibrium with interest rate
control. This condition then implies that in comparing prudent
equilibria (under some regulation) with gambling equilibria (un-
der some regulation) we need only consider the gambling equilibria
with no regulation (assuming that such an equilibrium exists).
Optimal regulation: interest rate ceiling.
We now find conditions under which it is possible and meaningful
to impose an interest rate ceiling that is non-binding. As before
this means that without regulation there would be a gambling
equilibrium with a lower welfare than a potential prudent equi-
librium with regulation and that the latter type of equilibria can
actually be established. We thus require:
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(i) Without regulation there is a gambling equilibrium (a) with
full participation and (b) with the number of banks ≥ 2.
(ii) There exists a prudent equilibrium with a non binding interest
rate ceiling (a) with full participation and (b) with the number of
banks ≥ 2 .
(iii) Welfare in the prudent equilibrium with the non-binding inter-
est ceiling is higher than welfare in any other possible equilibrium
with or without regulation.
For (i) we require k˜(π) > 0, which is equivalent to:
γ − α >
√
μρC
D
2
(√
ρ+ π
(1− π)ρ − 1
)
(28)
as well as (1 + γ)D > 32
√
μ(π+ρ)C
1−π (see (12) above), 0 < π < πG
(see (7) above).
For (ii) we require (25) to hold which we repeat here for con-
venience:
−π(1 + ρ)
1− π
μC
D2
+
γ − α
D
√
ρCμ ≤ 0
and (10) while condition (b) follows from (i).
As concerning (iii) we know from the definition of WP (k) that
a prudent equilibrium with no regulation welfare dominates any
prudent equilibrium with capital control. Since nP (r) ≥ nP > n∗
it follows that a prudent equilibrium with no regulation also wel-
fare dominates any prudent equilibrium with interest rate ceiling.
Finally we know from Lemma 3 that a prudent equilibrium with
no regulation welfare dominates a gambling equilibrium with no
regulation which in turn welfare dominates all gambling equilib-
ria with capital control (see definition of WG(k)). If, furthermore,
π ≤ 34 , then we know that a gambling equilibrium with no regu-
lation welfare dominates all gambling equilibria with interest rate
control. Thus π ≤ 34 is sufficient to guarantee (iii). We can now
state
Proposition 3. There are values of the parameters such that
conditions (i)-(iii) above are fulfilled, i.e. such that the optimal
35
feasible policy is to impose an interest rate ceiling that is non-
binding.
Proof: Note that (28) holds if
γ − α >
√
μC
D
2
√
ρ+ π
1− π (29)
Pick γ > 0 and π ≤ 34 s.t. (1 − π)γ − π < 0 and then a value
V of
√
μC
D so small that
1
2γ >
√
μC
D 2
√
1+π
1−π (so that (29) holds for
all ρ ≤ 1 and α ≤ γ/2), and that both (1 + α)D ≥ 32
√
μρC
1−π and
(1 + γ)D > 32
√
μ(π+ρ)C
1−π hold when α = 0 and ρ = 1. We can
then pick values of μ and C s.t. πG =
1− 4C
μ
ρ
1+ 4C
μ
> 34 for ρ = 1 -
hence also for ρ < 1. By picking ρ > 0 sufficiently small, we can
then guarantee that (25) holds even with α = 0. Setting finally
α = min{γ2 , ρ2} we assure that γ > α > (1 − π)γ + πβ for some
β > −1 and that ρ > α, as well as all the other conditions. 
Optimal regulation: capital control
For capital control to make sense we need the conditions (i) - (vii),
outlined in ”Meaningful Regulation” in Section 3, to hold and
that the best prudent equilibrium with interest control is welfare
dominated by the prudent equilibrium with capital control.
As we already found, welfare in a prudent equilibrium with
capital control is
WP (k) = D
[
1 + α− (ρ− α)k − 5
4
√
μρC
D
]
(30)
which, using (14), becomes
WP (k˜ (π))
= D
⎡⎣1 + α− (ρ− α)
√
μρC
D 2
(√
ρ+π
(1−π)ρ − 1
)
− (γ − α)
ρ− α− 1+ρ1−π + (1 + γ)
− 5
4
√
μρC
D
⎤⎦
(31)
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while in a prudent equilibrium with a binding interest rate ceiling
r it is
WP (r) = D(1 + α)− μ
4nP (r)
− CnP (r)ρ
= D(1 + α)− μρC
4D(α− r) −D(α− r)
that is
WP (r) = D
[
1 + r − μρC
4D2(α− r)
]
. (32)
By (23) this yields
WP (rP (π)) = D
[
1 + (ρ+π)α−ρ(1−π)γπ(1+ρ) − δ(γ−α)ρC4D(α− (ρ+π)α−ρ(1−π)γ
π(1+ρ)
)
]
.
Finally, if the ceiling is not binding, then WP (r) is
WP (0) = D
[
1 + α− 5
4
√
μρC
D
]
. (33)
The following example illustrates the various possible incidences.
Example 2. We take the same parameter values as in Example
1, i.e. α = 0.06, β = −0.1, γ = ρ = 0.1, μ = 1, C = 0.025 and
D = 10, which yield π˜∞ = 0.035088 < π̂0 = 0.1817 < π = 0.2 < π∗
= 0.20503 < π˜0 = 0.68571 < πG = 0.9 and I = (0.20503, 0.68571) .
In Figure 3 we show welfare (panel (a)) and number of firms (panel
(b)) depending on π corresponding to equilibria in four different
regimes: (i) gambling equilibirum without regulation, WG, (eq.
19), and nG, (6), (ii) prudent equilibrium with capital require-
ment, WP , (31), and nP , (4), (iii) prudent equilibrium with inter-
est control and binding ceiling, WP , (5), and nP , (21), and (iv)
prudent equilibrium with interest control and non-binding ceiling,
WP (0), (33), and nP , (4).
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(a)
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π
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(b)
n∗
nP
nPnG
π1 π2 π3 π˜0π∗
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0
10
20
30
π
n
Fig. 3: Welfare and number of firms
The upper line in panel (a) shows the first-best value of welfare
W ∗ using the prudent asset. In regime (i) where π < π∗, gam-
bling equilibrium dominates the other equilibria. In (ii) (π∗ ≤ π ≤
0.330822 =: π1) prudent equilibrium with capital control domi-
nates both the gambling equilibrium and the prudent equilibrium
with interest ceiling. Then for π ≤ 0.42105 =: π2 (regime (iii)),
interest control with binding ceiling is best. Until here, in accor-
dance with condition (25), a prudent equilibrium with non-binding
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interest ceiling does not exist. That changes at π2 (regime (iv))
where the interest ceiling ceases to be binding and the equilibrium
becomes one with non-binding interest ceiling until the end of the
interval of relevant probabilities, i.e. π ≤ π˜0.
Note that, if it were possible to impose a deposit interest rate
floor, the optimum could be reached. It corresponds to r =
0.0575 = rP (π) with π = 0.5928 =: π3 in which case np = 10,
thus coinciding with the optimal number of firms n∗. This is also
consistent with banks’ total cost being equal to revenue, Dr +
nρC = 0.575 + 0.025 = 0.6 = Dα, so that their profit is zero.
However, if banks are free to choose an interest rate r smaller than
or equal to r = 0.0575, then they will indeed choose a smaller one
and r = r is not an equilibrium rate.
Regarding the number of banks (panel (b)), in regime (i) it
decreases from 20 to 10.21, jumps at π∗ back to 20 (regime (ii)),
jumps again at the boundary between (ii) and regime (iii), when
there is a switch to binding interest control, to 29.424, which then
decreases again steadily to 20 when there is the further switch to
regime (iv). From this it is to be seen that the number of firms is
larger when there is a binding interest ceiling, i.e. π ∈ (π1, π2), so
that deposit rate control leads to a bloated banking sector. Within
(π1, π2), the smaller is π, the larger is the number of firms, which
at π1 becomes so costly that it is optimal to switch to capital
control (regime (ii)) despite the cost of outside capital. 
The above example illustrates the following general result:
Proposition 4. There are values of the parameters such that the
best feasible policy is to impose capital requirements.
Proof: From (31) and (5) it follows that, by increasing D suffi-
ciently, WP (k˜ (π)) > WP (rP (π)) can be obtained from
α− (ρ− α) −(γ − α)
ρ− α− 1+ρ1−π + (1 + γ)
>
(ρ+ π)α− ρ(1− π)γ
π(1 + ρ)
(34)
whenever that is satisfied. Now the RHS becomes for π = π, since
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α = (1− π)γ + πβ,
(ρ+ π)α− ρ(1− π)γ
π(1 + ρ)
=
(ρ+ π)α− ρ (α− πβ)
π(1 + ρ)
=
α+ ρβ
1 + ρ
which is stricly smaller than α as β < α, which is equivalent to
α + ρβ < (1 + ρ)α, i.e. (α+ ρβ) / (1 + ρ) < α. But α is also the
value of the LHS of (34) for ρ = α. Thus ρ and π can be somewhat
increased above α and π, respectively, without invalidating (34).

In Figure 4 we summarize the relationship between π and
the occurrence of the various types of equilibrium and regulatory
regimes. The details of derivation are given in Appendix 4. The
figure shows prudent equilibria with interest ceiling in panel (a)
and combines it with prudent equilibria with capital control (panel
(b), reproducing Fig. 2) and welfare (panel (c), reproducing panel
(a) of Fig. 3).
Curve C1C1 in panel (a) shows where condition (24) is satis-
fied with equality while the inequality is violated inside the region
delineated by C1C1. Similarly curve C2C2 depicts equality in con-
dition (23), and the inequality is satisfied below it. C2C2 reaches
the unconstrained equilibrium value rP at π2. Thus region A is the
set of all pairs (π, r) such that a prudent equilibrium with binding
interest ceiling occurs while region B is the corresponding set of
prudent equilibria with non-binding ceiling.
Panel (b) shows the optimal values of capital requirement for
varying π. While in Fig. 2 only capital control was considered,
now also interest control is an option. In fact, although capital
control remains the best policy for probabilities between π∗ and
π1, as can be seen from panel (c) this is no longer true for π > π1.
Between π1 and π2 interest control with binding interest ceiling
is optimal while between π2 and π˜0 the same is true for interest
control with non-binding interest ceiling. Beyond π˜0 no regulation
is required to obtain a prudent equilibrium.
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Fig. 4: Different equilibria depending on the probability of bankruptcy
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W
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It is well understood that capital requirements may alleviate
the moral hazard problem of the bank choosing an asset that is ex-
cessively risky and possibly with a too low expected pay-off. The
reason is that bank capital has a lower seniority than deposits,
which induces the bank to seek a lower variance of pay-offs. On
the other hand, deposit rate control is often thought to address
moral hazard issues through another channel. By reducing the
rate paid to depositors and thus increasing profits, the value of
the bank as a going concern comes to include rents derived from
the ceiling imposed. Whenever the bank chooses an investment
strategy that may lead to it being bankrupt in an adverse sce-
nario the bank risks losing the discounted sum of all future rents,
its so-called franchise value, which in this sense also has a lower
seniority than the deposits owed. There is however another, more
direct effect of a deposit rate ceiling since it prevents a bank engag-
ing in excessively risky activities from attracting more depositors
by offering a higher interest rate. This means (assuming inelas-
tic supply of deposits) that the bank cannot exploit increasing
returns, present whenever it chooses an investment strategy that
involves a positive probability that it will not be able to pay back
its depositors and hence be declared bankrupt. Since entry is free
in our model, only this direct effect is relevant when we compare
the two regulatory tools.
It is natural to assume that capital requirements are costly
because the opportunity cost of capital is higher than the returns
offered by the bank’s normal activities. What is then the cost
of deposit rate ceilings? The most immediate answer is financial
repression. Lowering the interest offered will reduce the flow of
funds through banks and into investment with attractive returns.
While this effect could potentially be studied in our model, by
assuming full participation (that is that all potential depositors
place all their savings with the banks) we have in effect assumed
away this effect. In our model deposit rate ceilings are potentially
costly because they lead to excessive entry of banks and hence
excessive cost of setting up banks. Indeed when one compares
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(30) and (32), the costs of setting up a bank, C, enters negatively
in the welfare in a regime with interest rate control, while in the
welfare of a regime with capital only the square root of C enters
negatively.
6 Conclusion
There are two possible negative consequences of deposit rate con-
trol, namely financial repression (reduced savings) and inefficien-
cies in the organization and operation of the banking industry. As
is clear from the model of Repullo (2004) (as well as from our re-
sults) the first negative effect may also be present when regulators
use capital requirements (since the cost of these may be passed
on to depositors in the form of lower deposit rates). The second
effect is however more likely to be associated with a regime that
restricts competition between banks. But when the number of
banks is given, as in Repullo’s model (and implicity in the model
of Hellman et. al., 1997) this second effect cannot come to the
fore. In fact, if financial repression is ignored (as is done here and
in Repullo’s model), any ambiguity about the welfare effects origi-
nates solely with distributional issues since there is no deadweight
loss arising from deposit rate control.14 We allow for a potential
deadweight loss by letting the number of banks be endogenously
determined and this means that now there is a real trade-off be-
tween the two regimes.
Two stylized facts seem to corroborate the relevance of our
analysis. The first is the high number of banks present under
regimes with interest rate ceilings, or equivalently the consolida-
tion that took place in countries that changed from interest rate
control to capital control. The other is that the transfer from
a regime with interest rate control to a regime with capital con-
trol seem to have been accompanied with an increase in the real
rate offered to depositors. This indicates that the ceiling imposed
14Such ambiguity due to distributional issues could incidentally be removed
by assuming that depositors are the owners of all banks.
43
on interest rates was binding. Since a non-binding ceiling is not
costly (in terms of the number of banks) and hence to be pre-
ferred if feasible, these two (not unrelated) observations indicate
that controlling the deposit rate was costly and that there may
have been savings associated with transferring to a regime with
capital control.
We shall not claim that, like in our model, banks were free
to establish themselves during the times of deposit rate control,
but we think that there is likely to have been pressure on regu-
lators (e.g. from local politicians) to allow the number of banks
to increase. In our model, with free entry, the potential negative
consequences of such excess entry then becomes clear. Like Re-
pullo (2004), but unlike Hellman et. al. (1997), we have only
compared the two extremes: deposit rate control only or capital
requirements only. It would be surprising if no combination of
these did better (in fact this is what Hellman et. al., 1997, to
some extend find), but an evaluation of the optimal combination
of the two instruments is outside the scope of our analysis. Rather,
our contribution has been to make explicit possible societal costs
of each type of regulation, which should, in turn, be helpful in
understanding the trade-offs between them.
Appendix 1: Proofs of Lemma 4 and Proposition 2
Proof of Lemma 4
(i) By definition of k̂ (π) its derivative is given by
∂k̂
∂π
= −
(
−∂WG (0, π)
∂π
)
/
∂WP
(
k̂ (π)
)
∂k
Since (16) implies ∂WP (k)∂k = (α− ρ)D < 0 we thus get sgn ∂k̂∂π =
−sgn∂WG(0,π)∂π .
Regarding ∂WG(0,π)∂π , from (17) and k = 0 we obtain
WG (0, π) = [1 + (1− π) γ + πβ]D −
[
1
4
μ
nG
+ nG (ρ+ π)C
]
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with nG given by (6). Setting
A (π) = [1 + (1− π) γ + πβ]D,B (π) =
[
1
4
μ
nG
+ nG (ρ+ π)C
]
this yields
∂WG (0, π)
∂π
= A′ (π)−B′ (π)
Clearly A′ (π) < 0 as γ > β while
B′ (π) = −1
4
μ
n′G
n2G
+ n′G (ρ+ π)C + nGC
and thus the sign of B′ (π) is undetermined. Setting in (6)
f (π) :=
1− π
ρ+ π
we obtain
n′G =
1
2
√
μ
C
(f (π))−1/2 f ′ (π) =
f ′ (π)
2f (π)
nG = g (π)nG
where g (π) := f ′ (π) / (2f (π)) . Therefore
B′ (π)nG = −1
4
μg (π) + g (π)n2G (ρ+ π)C + n
2
GC (35)
Now
f ′ (π) =
(ρ+ π) (−1)− (1− π)
(ρ+ π)2
= − 1 + ρ
(ρ+ π)2
and thus
g (π) = − 1 + ρ
2 (ρ+ π)2
(
1− π
ρ+ π
)−1
= − 1 + ρ
2 (ρ+ π) (1− π)
Using (6), equation (35) becomes therefore
B′ (π)nG = μ
1 + ρ
8 (ρ+ π) (1− π) − μ
1 + ρ
2 (ρ+ π)
+ μ
1− π
ρ+ π
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⇔B′ (π)nG (ρ+ π)
μ
=
1 + ρ
8 (1− π) −
1 + ρ
2
+ 1− π
=
1 + ρ− 4 (1− π) (1 + ρ) + 8 (1− π)2
8 (1− π) (36)
From this it is clear that B′ (π) > 0 iff (36) is positive which in turn
is true iff its numerator is so. Now set x := 1 + ρ and y := 1− π.
We know that x ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. Then consider the inequality
x− 4xy + 8y2 > 0. It is equivalent to⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1) x > −8y
2
1−4y if y < 1/4
(2) 8y2 > 0 if y = 1/4
(3) x < −8y
2
1−4y if y > 1/4
Case (1) is satisfied since x is positive while case (2) is trivial.
Case (3) can be rewritten
x <
8y2
4y − 1 if y > 1/4 (37)
To see what this implies for x minimize the RHS. Its derivative is
(4y − 1) 16y − 8y2 · 4
(4y − 1)2 =
32y2 − 16y
(4y − 1)2
which is zero iff y = 1/2 =: ymin. Then (37) yields for its RHS
8y2min/ (4ymin − 1) = 2. Since x = 1+ ρ, to satisfy (37) - and thus
∂k̂/∂π > 0 - it is therefore sufficient to have ρ < 1 which is what
we have assumed.
(ii) This follows from (20).
(iii) Setting in (20)
k̂A(π) :=
α− (1− π)γ − πβ
ρ− α
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and
k̂B(π) :=
√
μC
(ρ− α)
[√
ρ+ π
1− π (
5
4
− π)− 5
4
√
ρ
]
we obtain
k̂(π) = k̂A(π) + k̂B(π)/D
Then k̂′A = γ − β > 0, k̂A(0) = (α− γ) / (ρ− α) < 0, k̂A(1) =
(α− β) / (ρ− α) > 0 and k̂A(π) = 0 iff π = (γ − β) / (y − α) =
π(γ, α, β).
Regarding k̂B(π), we have k̂B(0) = 0 and limπ→1 k̂B(π) = ∞.
To see what is the sign of k̂B(π) for π ∈ (0, 1) notice that k̂B(π) ≥ 0
iff
(ρ+ π)
(
5
4
− π
)2
− 25
16
ρ (1− π) ≥ 0 (38)
⇔
25
16
ρ− 5
2
ρπ + ρπ2 +
25
16
π − 5
2
π2 + π3 − 25
16
ρ+
25
16
ρπ ≥ 0
⇔
π3 +
(
ρ− 5
2
)
π2 +
(
25
16
− 15
16
ρ
)
π ≥ 0
and k̂B(π) = 0 iff π = 0 or
π2 +
(
ρ− 5
2
)
π +
25
16
− 15
16
ρ = 0
Solving the last equation for ρ yields
ρ
(
π − 15
16
)
= −π2 + 5
2
π − 25
16
= −
(
5
4
− π
)2
⇔
ρ =
(
5
4 − π
)2
15
16 − π
=: ρ (π)
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From this follows
dρ
dπ
=
−2 (54 − π) (1516 − π)+ (54 − π)2(
15
16 − π
)2
=
(
5
4
− π
) −2 (1516 − π)+ 54 − π(
15
16 − π
)2 = 54 − π(15
16 − π
)2 (π − 58
)
.
For π ∈ [0, 15/16] this yields dρ/dπ = 0 iff π = 5/8 which, since
ρ (π) → ∞ for π → 15/16 > 5/8, is the unique minimizer of
ρ (π) in [0, 15/16]. But ρ (5/8) =
(
5
8 − 54
)2
/
(
15
16 − 58
)
= 5/4 which
means that for all ρ < 5/4 k̂B(π) = 0 for all π ∈ [0, 15/16] and,
since for ρ = 1 and π = 5/8 (38) is satisfied with strict inequality
(LHS = 25/83), k̂B(π) > 0 for all π ∈ (0, 15/16) whenever ρ < 5/4.
To see what is the sign of k̂B(π) for π ≥ 15/16 observe for the
LHS of (38) that for π > 0
(ρ+ π)
(
5
4
− π
)2
− 25
16
ρ (1− π)
> ρ
(
5
4
− π
)2
− 25
16
ρ (1− π)
= ρ
(
−5
2
π + π2 +
25
16
π
)
= ρπ
(
π − 15
16
)
which is non-negative for π ≥ 15/16. Thus k̂B(π) > 0 for all
π ∈ (0, 1].
Regarding k̂(π), since k̂A(0) < 0, k̂B(0) = 0, k̂A(π) = 0,
k̂B(π) > 0 and k̂ = k̂A+ k̂B/D is strictly increasing in π under our
assumption ρ < 1, there exists a unique π̂0 such that k̂(π̂0) = 0
for any D > 0, and this π̂0 must be smaller than π. 
Proof of Proposition 2
We proceed by selecting sequentially all parameters except π so
that there will be an open interval I such that, for all parameters
picked and any π ∈ I, all the parameter restrictions (i) - (viii) are
fulfilled.
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Pick α > 0, β ≥ −1, γ and ρ < 1 s.t. (i) holds. Then by (1)
π < 1 so that (ii) can be satisfied.
Next consider (iii). By Lemma 2 and since π˜∞ < π, to obtain
k˜(π) > 0 it is sufficient to have π˜0 > π and π ∈ (π, π˜0). But since
by (15) π˜0 → 1 for D/
√
μρC → ∞ there exists L1 > 0 s.t.
π˜0 > π for all C,D, μ with D/
√
μρC ≥ L1 (39)
Regarding (iv), from (iii), i.e. π < π˜0, it is sufficient to have
πG > π˜0. Since by (15) and (7) both π˜0 and πG tend to 1 for
C → 0, the question is which of two converges faster. To this end
we show that, if μ and D are such that
μ > (γ − α)D (40)
then there exists a threshold function C (D,μ) > 0 such that
πG > π˜0 for all C < C (D,μ) .
Indeed, write π˜0 as
π˜0 =
(
A√
C
+ 1
)2
− 1(
A√
C
+ 1
)2
+B
< 1, A =
(γ − α)D
2
√
μρ
,B =
1
ρ
and πG as
πG =
1− aC
1 + bC
, a = 4ρ/μ, b = 4/μ.
Then
π˜0 =
A2
C +
2A√
C
A2
C +
2A√
C
+ 1 +B
=
A2 + 2A
√
C
A2 + 2A
√
C + (1 +B)C
=
1 + 2A
√
C
1 + 2A
√
C + 1+B
A2
C
and π˜0 < πG iff(
1 +
2
A
√
C
)
(1 + bC) <
(
1 +
2
A
√
C +
1 +B
A2
C
)
(1− aC)
49
⇔
1 + bC + 2A
√
C + 2bAC
√
C
< 1−aC+ 2A
√
C− 2aA C
√
C+ 1+BA2 C−
a(1+B)
A2 C
2
⇔(
a+ b− 1 +B
A2
)
C +
2 (a+ b)
A
C
√
C +
a (1 +B)
A2
C2 < 0 (41)
Now since C
√
C and C2 converge faster to zero than C, this in-
equality is satisfied for some small enough C > 0 iff a + b −
(1 +B) /A2 < 0. From the above definitions of the parameters
a, b,A and B this amounts to
4ρ
μ
+
4
μ
−
1 + 1ρ(
(γ−α)D
2
√
μρ
)2 = 4μ (ρ+ 1)− 4 (ρ+ 1)μ(γ − α)2D2
= 4 (ρ+ 1)
[
1
μ
− μ
(γ − α)2D2
]
being negative which, since ρ > −1, is equivalent to (40).
At this point, choose δ > 1 and set
μ = δ (γ − α)D (42)
for the remainder of the proof, and write by a slight abuse of
notation
C (D) = C (D, δ (γ − α)D) .
Then, since now D/
√
μρC =
√
D/
√
δ (γ − α) ρC, (39) can be
rephrased as follows: there exist C1 > 0 and D1 > 0 such that
π˜0 > π for all C ≤ C1,D ≥ D1
As regards (v), note that from (14) and (42)
k˜(π) =
√
δ(γ−α)DρC
D
2
[√
ρ+π
(1−π)ρ
−1
]
−(γ−α)
ρ−α− 1+ρ
1−π
+1+γ
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=
(1−π)
{
2
√
δ(γ−α)ρC/D
[√
ρ+π
(1−π)ρ
−1
]
−(γ−α)
}
(1−π)(ρ−α+1+γ)−(1+ρ)
=
2
√
δ(γ−α)ρC/D
[√
(1−π)(ρ+π)
ρ
−(1−π)
]
−(1−π)(γ−α)
(1−π)(γ−α)−π(1+ρ)
≤ −(1−π)(γ−α)(1−π)(γ−α)−π(1+ρ)
The last inequality follows from the fact that the denominator
(1− π) (γ − α)− π (1 + ρ) = (1− π)
(
ρ− α− 1 + ρ
1− π + 1 + γ
)
is negative for π > π and, moreover,√
(1− π) (ρ+ π)
ρ
− (1− π) ≥ 0 for π ≤ 1.
Next, since
α > (1− π) γ + πβ ≥ (1− π) γ − π
for π > π, we have
(1− π) (γ−α) = (1− π) γ−(1− π)α < α+π−(1− π)α = π (1 + α)
(43)
This implies
k˜(π) ≤ −π (1 + α)
(1− π) (γ − α)− π (1 + ρ) =
1 + α
1 + ρ− 1−ππ (γ − α)
where now the denominator of the last fraction is positive for π ≤
π < π˜0. This yields
1 + α− k˜(π) (ρ− α) ≥ (1 + α)
[
1− ρ− α
1 + ρ− 1−ππ (γ − α)
]
≥ (1 + α)
[
1− ρ− α
1 + ρ− 1−ππ (γ − α)
]
= : L2 > 0
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which is positive since by (43)
1 + ρ− 1− π
π
(γ − α)− (ρ− α) = 1 + α− 1
π
(1− π) (γ − α) > 0
Consequently
(1+ rP (k˜(π), nP ))D = [1+α− (ρ−α)k˜(π)]D− μ
nP
≥ L2D−
μ
nP
.
Thus to satisfy (v) it is sufficient to have L2D ≥ 3μ/ (2nP ) . From
(4) and (42) this amounts to
L2D ≥
3μ
2
√
μ
ρC
=
3
2
√
μρC =
3
2
√
δ (γ − α) ρCD
which can be achieved by increasing D and/or decreasing C ap-
propriately. Thus there exist C2 > 0 and D2 > 0 such that
(1 + rP (k˜(π), nP ))D ≥ μ
2nP
for all (C,D) with C ≤ C2,D ≥ D2
Now consider (vi). By (8) it is equivalent to
(1 + γ)D − μ
nG
≥ μ
2nG
and thus by (6) to
(1 + γ)D ≥ 3
2
√
μ (ρ+ π)C
1− π .
Since π ≤ π˜0, this is implied by
(1 + γ)D ≥ 3
2
√
μ (ρ+ π˜0)C
1− π˜0 (44)
which, using (42) and (15), becomes
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(1 + γ)D ≥ 3
2
√√√√√√√√√√√√
δ (γ − α)D
⎛⎝ρ+
[
γ−α
2
D√
δ(γ−α)DρC
+1
]2
−1[
γ−α
2
D√
δ(γ−α)DρC
+1
]2
+ 1
ρ
⎞⎠C
1−
[
γ−α
2
D√
δ(γ−α)DρC
+1
]2
−1[
γ−α
2
D√
δ(γ−α)DρC
+1
]2
+ 1
ρ
= 32
√√√√ δ(γ−α)D(ρ[γ−α2 √ Dδ(γ−α)ρC+1]2+[ γ−α2 √ Dδ(γ−α)ρC+1]2)C
1
ρ
+1
= 32
√
δ (γ − α)Dρ
(
γ−α
2
√
D
δ(γ−α)ρC + 1
)2
C
= 32
√
δ (γ − α)Dρ
((γ−α
2
)2 D
δ(γ−α)ρC + (γ − α)
√
D
δ(γ−α)ρC + 1
)
C
= 32
√
δ (γ − α)Dρ
((γ−α
2
)2 D
δ(γ−α)ρ + (γ − α)
√
CD
δ(γ−α)ρ + C
)
For C = 0 the last expression yields
3
2
√
D2
(
γ − α
2
)2
=
3
4
(γ − α)D
and thus at C = 0 condition (44) becomes
1 + γ ≥ 3
4
(γ − α)
which is always fulfilled with strict inequality. Thus there exists
C3 such that (vii) is satisfied for all C ≤ C3. At this point we can
set D = max {D0,D1,D2} and C = min
{
C0, C1, C2, C3, C (D)
}
.
Then for 0 < C ≤ C and D ≥ D the parameter restrictions (i) to
(vi) are fulfilled.
Finally, to also satisfy (vii), i.e. k̂(π) > k˜(π), note that, as a
consequence of Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, k̂(π) and k˜(π) intersect for
some π∗ ∈ (π̂0, π˜0). If C and D are chosen such that 0 < C ≤ C
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and D ≥ D, then k̂(π) > k˜(π) for all π in the (non-empty and
non-degenerate) interval I = (max {π∗, π} , π˜0) , and all parameter
restrictions are met. 
Appendix 2: Analysis regarding capital requirements
Equilibrium with the prudent asset
As in Repullo we study the symmetric equilibrium when all banks
use the prudent asset. Corresponding to equation (4) in Repullo
we have that each bank maximizes the present value of future
profits, i.e. solves:
max
rj
−kD(rj , r, n) + 1
1 + ρ
[α− rj +(1+α)k]D(rj , r, n) + 1
1 + ρ
VP
(45)
where VP is the value for the individual bank of being in the pru-
dent equilibrium. Using (2), the first order condition for this prob-
lem is
−kD
2
μ
− 1
1 + ρ
D(rj, r, n) +
1
1 + ρ
[α− rj + (1 + α)k]D
2
μ
= 0
Since we are considering a symmetric equilibrium we set rj = r
which, after multiplying through by (1+ρ)μ
D2
, gives
−(1 + ρ)k − μ
nD
+ α− r + (1 + α)k = 0
that is
rP (n, k) = α− μ
nD
− δP k (46)
where δP = ρ− α. Note that this equation puts some limits on k.
Inserting this interest rate in the maximand above we get
VP = −kD
n
+
1
1 + ρ
[
μ
nD
+ (ρ− α)k + (1 + α)k]D
n
+
1
1 + ρ
VP
=
1
1 + ρ
μ
n2
+
1
1 + ρ
VP
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so that
VP =
μ
ρn2
(47)
just like in Repullo(2004). The reason for this equality is that D
has two impacts on the banks: firstly an increase in D increases
competition by making depositors willing to travel further, which
has a negative impact on the value of being in the market. Sec-
ondly, it enhances the return for every depositor the bank has,
which increases VP . These two effects exactly offset each other.
Setting VP = C we finally get
nP =
√
μ
ρC
(48)
Equilibrium with the gambling asset
Here in a symmetric equilibrium each bank j is choosing its interest
rate rj to solve
max
rj
−kD(rj , r, n)+ 1− π
1 + ρ
[γ− rj +(1+ γ)k]D(rj , r, n)+ 1− π
1 + ρ
VG
(49)
where VG is the value, to the bank, of the gambling equilibrium.
The first order condition for this problem is
−kD
2
μ
− 1− π
1 + ρ
D(rj , r, n) +
1− π
1 + ρ
[γ − rj + (1 + γ)k]D
2
μ
= 0
Setting, as before rj = r, and multiplying through by
1+ρ
1−π
μ
D2
gives
us
−k 1 + ρ
1− π −
μ
nD
+ γ − r + (1 + γ)k = 0
that is
rG(k, n) = γ − μ
nD
− δGk (50)
where
δG =
1 + ρ
1− π − (1 + γ) .
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Inserting rG into the objective function we find
VG = −kD
n
+
1− π
1 + ρ
[
μ
nD
+(
1 + ρ
1− π−(1+γ))k+(1+γ)k]
D
n
+VG
1− π
1 + ρ
so that
VG =
1− π
1 + ρ
μ
n2
+
1− π
1 + ρ
VG
i.e.
VG =
μ
n2
1− π
ρ+ π
which is the same as in Repullo. Setting this equal to C we get
nG =
√
μ
C
√
1− π
ρ+ π
(51)
Viability of the prudent equilibrium
Like in Repullo(2004) we next find the condition for viability of
the prudent equilibrium, i.e. we ask if, when the nP − 1 other
banks use the prudent equilibrium, it pays for an individual bank
to deviate. Such a bank would solve
max
rj
−kD(rj , rP (nP , k), nP ) + 1− π
1 + ρ
[γ − rj + (1 + γ)k]
×D(rj, rP (nP , k), nP ) + 1− π
1 + ρ
VP
with first order condition
−kD2μ − 1−π1+ρ [
rj−rP (nP ,k)
μ D
2 + DnP ] +
1−π
1+ρ (γ − rj + (1 + γ)k)D
2
μ = 0
Multiplying through by 1+ρ1−π
μ
D2 we get
−k 1 + ρ
1− π − (rj − rP (nP , k))−
μ
DnP
+ γ − rj + (1 + γ)k = 0
so that
rj =
rG(nP , k) + rP (nP , k)
2
(52)
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Notice that we did not impose participation constraints on the de-
viator, i.e. we do not take into account that some depositors may
choose not to walk to any bank, if the deviator offers an interest
rate different from rP (nP , k). The reason is that if deviation is not
desirable without this constraint, it is certainly not desirable with
the constraint. Thus we find sufficient conditions for the viability
of the prudent equilibrium.
Remark 5. In the maximization problem we have assumed that
a deviator chooses to invest entirely in the gambling asset. Let us
briefly justify this. If the deviator may invest in both assets his
problem becomes
max
rj ,z∈[0,]
−kD(rj, rP (nP , k), nP )
+
{
π
1 + ρ
max{0, z[β + (1 + β)k] + (z − 1)[α+ (1 + α)k] − rj}
+
1− π
1 + ρ
[zγ + (1− z)α− rj + (1 + zγ + (1− z)α)k]
}
×D(rj, rP (nP , k), nP )
+[1{z[β+(1+β)k]+(z−1)[α+(1+α)k]−rj≥0}(z, rj)
π
1 + ρ
+
1− π
1 + ρ
]VP
where 1{·}(z, r) is the indicator function. Letting r∗ and z∗ being
the solutions, if z∗[β + (1 + β)k] + (z∗ − 1)[α+ (1 + α)k]− r∗ ≥ 0
(which, because α > β then also holds for z ≤ z∗), z∗ must solve
max
z≤z∗
−kD(r∗, rP (nP , k), nP )
+
{
π
1 + ρ
[z[β + (1 + β)k] + (z − 1)[α+ (1 + α)k]]
+
1− π
1 + ρ
[zγ + (1− z)α− r∗ + (1 + zγ + (1− z)α)k − r∗]
}
×D(r∗, rP (nP , k), nP )
+
1
1 + ρ
VP
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However, since π[β+(1+β)k]+(1−π)[γ+(1+γ)k] < α+(1+α)k,
this means that z∗ = 0. If, on the other hand, z∗[β + (1 + β)k] +
(z∗ − 1)[α + (1 + α)k]− r∗ < 0, z∗ must solve
max
z≥z∗
−kD(r∗, rP (nP , k), nP ) + 1− π
1 + ρ
[zγ + (1− z)α− r∗
+(1 + zγ + (1− z)α)k]D(r∗, rP (nP , k), nP ) + 1
1 + ρ
VP
which, because γ > α, means that z∗ = 1 
Using (52), we now find the value of the deviation to the bank:
−k[ rG(nP ,k)−rP (nP ,k)2μ D2+ DnP ]+
1−π
1+ρ [γ− rG(nP ,k)+rP (nP ,k)2 +(1+γ)k]
×[ rG(nP ,k)−rP (nP ,k)2μ D2 + DnP ] +
1−π
1+ρVP
= 1−π1+ρ [γ − rG(nP ,k)−rP (nP ,k)2 + (1 + γ)k − 1+ρ1+πk][ rG(nP ,k)−rP (nP ,k)2μ
+ DnP ] +
1−π
1+ρVP
= 1−π1+ρ [rG(nP , k) +
μ
nPD
− rG(nP ,k)−rP (nP ,k)2μ [ rG(nP ,k)−rP (nP ,k)2μ
+ DnP ] +
1−π
1+ρVP
= 1−π1+ρ [
rG(nP ,k)−rD(nP ,k)
2 +
μ
nPD
][ rG(nP ,k)−rP (nP ,k)2μ
+ DnP ] +
1−π
1+ρVP
= 1−π1+ρ [
{(rG(nP ,k)−rD(nP ,k))D}2
4μ +
(rG(nP ,k)−rD(nP ,k))D}2
nP
+ μ
n2P
+ 1−π1+ρVP
Thus for a prudent equilibrium to exist we require
1−π
1+ρ
[{(rG(nP ,k)−rD(nP ,k))D}2
4μ +
(rG(nP ,k)−rD(nP ,k))D}2
nP
+ VP
]
+ μ
n2P
≤ VP
This condition is parallel to the condition of Repullo (2004) in his
proof of Proposition 1, and using a parallel reasoning this can be
rewritten as
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{(rG(nP ,k)−rD(nP ,k))D}2
2 +(rG(nP , k)−rD(nP , k))D μnP −(h2−1)
[
μ
nP
]2
≤ 0
where h =
√
ρ+π
(1−π)ρ which, following the argument of Repullo
means that the requirement is
μ
nP
≥ γ − α− (δG − δP )k
2(h− 1) D = mP (k)D (53)
and where, as in Repullo (2004), mP (k) =
γ−α−(δG−δP )k
2(h−1) .
Viability of the gambling equilibrium
The problem of a deviator (one among nG banks) is to choose an
interest rate rj to solve
max
rj
−kD(rj , rG, nG)+ 1
1 + ρ
[α−rj+(1+α)k]D(rj , rG, nG)+ 1
1 + ρ
VG
(54)
The first order condition for this problem is
−kD2μ − 11+ρ [
rj−rG(nG,k)
μ D
2+ Dn ]+
1
1+ρ [α−rj+(1+α)k]D
2
μ = 0
Multiplying through by (1 + ρ) μ
D2
we get
−(1+ρ)k− (rj − rG(nG, k))− μ
nG(nG, k)D
+α− rj +(1+α)k = 0
so that
rj =
rG(nG, k) + rP (nG, k)
2
(55)
Inserting (55) into (54) we find the value of the deviation:
1
1+ρ [α− rG(nG,k)−rP (nG,k)2
+(1 + α)k − (1 + ρ)k][ rP (nG,k)−rG(nG,k)2μ D2 + Dn ] + 11+ρVG
= 11+ρ [
rP (nG,k)−rG(nG,k)
2 +
μ
nD ][
rP (nG,k)−rG(nG,k)
2μ D
2+Dn ]+
1
1+ρVG
= 11+ρ [
[(rP (nG,k)−rG(nG,k))D]2
4μ +
(rP (nG,k)−rG(nG,k))D
nG
+ μ
n2G
]+ 11+ρVG
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This means that deviating is not advantageous (i.e. all firms gam-
bling is a Nash equilibrium) if
1
1+ρ
[
[(rP (nG,k)−rG(nG,k))D]2
4μ +
(rP (nG,k)−rG(nG,k))D
nG
+ μ
n2
G
+ VG
]
≤ VG
that is
[(rP (nG,k)−rG(nG,k))D]2
4μ − (rP (nG,k)−rG(nG,k))DnG +
μ
n2G
− ρVG ≤ 0
that is, using the definition of VG, if
[(rP (nG,k)−rG(nG,k))D]2
4 −(rP (nG, k)−rG(nG, k))D μnG+(1−ρ
1−π
ρ−π )
{
μ
nG
}2
≤ 0
Noting that 1 − ρ1−πρ−π = 1 − 1h2 and using a reasoning parallel to
that of Repullo(2004) we then get the condition
μ
nG
≤ h[γ − α− (δG − δP )k]
2(h − 1) D = hmP (k)D = mG(k)D (56)
Notice that, as was the case for the prudent equilibrium, we did
not impose participation constraints on the deviator, the reasons
being the same as stated there. Thus we find sufficient conditions
for the viability of the gambling equilibrium.
Bankruptcy of a gambling bank in the bad state
We have assumed that a gambling bank will be bankrupt in the
bad state and shall now explain why this will always be so. Con-
sider first a prudent equilibrium and let
VG(rj) = −kD(rj , rP , nP ) + 1− π
1 + ρ
[γ − rj + (1 + γ)k]D(rj, rP , nP )
+
1− π
1 + ρ
VP
Maximizing VG(rj) gives rˆj. Suppose that (1+β)(1+ k) ≥ rˆj +1,
so that the deviating bank is not bankrupt in the bad state. Then
since in that case
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VG(rˆj) < −k−kD(rˆj , rP , nP )+ 1−π1+ρ [γ− rˆj+(1+γ)k]D(rˆj , rP , nP )
+ π1+ρ [β − rˆj + (1 + β)k]D(rˆj , rP , nP ) + 1−π1+ρVP
≤ −kD(rˆj, rP , nP ) + 11+ρ [α− rˆj + (1+α)k]D(rˆj , rP , nP ) + 11+ρVP
≤ VP
a deviation is not attractive. Notice that for any other choice of
interest rate, rj for a deviating bank, since VG(rj) ≤ VG(rˆj), if
(1+β)(1+ k) ≥ rˆj +1 this interest rate is not attractive. In other
words, the only attractive deviations imply bankruptcy. From this
we conclude that if VG(rj) ≥ VP a deviating bank is bankrupt in
the bad state.
Consider next the viability of a gambling equilibrium, (rG, nG). If
the banks are not bankrupt in the bad state, then by the reason-
ing above, it pays to deviate to the prudent equilibrium. Thus,
with VP (rˆj) being the value of an optimal deviation to a prudent
strategy, starting from a gambling equilibrium, if VG ≥ VP (rˆj) the
banks using the gambling strategy must be bankrupt in the bad
state.
We found that there is a k˜ such that both a gambling equilib-
rium (rG, nG) and a prudent equilibrium, (RP , nP ) exist.
In the gambling equilibrium a deviation by a single bank to a
prudent strategy does not increase discounted profits, which im-
plies that in the gambling equilibrium banks are bankrupt in the
bad state. In the prudent equilibrium, a deviation by a single bank
to the gambling strategy does not increase discounted expected
profits, which is only possible if the deviating bank is bankrupt in
the bad state.
As we increase k above k˜, only prudent equilibria are viable,
which could either mean that a optimal deviation implies no bank-
ruptcy or that it implies bankruptcy. As we lower k below k˜ the
prudent equilibrium is not viable since there always exists a profit-
increasing deviation to a gambling strategy (necessarily implying
bankruptcy in the bad state) and a gambling equilibrium is viable
(necessarily meaning that banks are bankrupt in the bad state).
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Since the optimal regulation using capital requirements sets
k = k˜ we have shown that assuming that gambling banks are
bankrupt in the bad state does not invalidate our analysis.
Welfare in the prudent equilibrium as the return of the average
consumer
There is another way to compute the welfare in the prudent equi-
librium, namely by looking at the return of the average consumer,
which is
(1 + rp)D − μ
4nP
(57)
We check that this is indeed equal to WP , thus we check whether
(1 + rP )D − 14 μnP = (1− α)(1 + k)D −
μ
4nP
− nP ρC − (1 + ρ)kD
i.e. if
(1 + α− μnPD − (ρ− α)k)D −
1
4
μ
nP
= (1+α)(1+k)D− μ4nP −nPρC−(1+ρ)kD
Since
(1+α)(1+k)D−ρnPC−(1+ρ)kD = (1+α)D−(ρ−α)kD−nP ρC
we just have to check if μnP = nPρC which is the case since
μ
Cρ =
n2P . 
Welfare in the gambling equilibrium as the return of the average
consumer
As we did with WP , we may also perform a consistency check of
WG, i.e. check if
(1− π)(1 + rG)D + π(1 + β)(1 + k)D − 1
4
μ
nG
= WG(k, π) (58)
Observing that
(1− π)(1 + rG)D + π(1 + β)(1 + k)D
= (1−π)
{
1 + γ − μnGD −
[
1+ρ
1−π − (1 + γ)
]
k
}
D+π(1+β)(1+k)D
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= [1 + (1− π)γ + πβ]D + [(1− π)(1 + γ) + π(1 + β)]kD
−(1 + ρ)kD − (1− π) μnG
we only need to check if
nG (ρ+ π)C = (1− π) μ
nG
However the LHS of this equation is
√
(1− π) (ρ+ π)μC as is the
RHS. So the two approaches to computing welfare in the gambling
equilibrium are indeed equivalent. 
Appendix 3: Analysis regarding deposit rate control
Remark 6. Bankruptcy of gambling banks under deposit rate con-
trol. As for capital requirements, it does not pay to deviate to
the gambling strategy with an interest rate that does not imply
bankruptcy in the bad state, hence we get the format of the prob-
lem presented in the main body of the text.
Further analysis of the gambling equilibrium with interest rate ceil-
ing.
We analyse case (a) where RG(r) = r and the optimal interest
rate for the deviator is r. For existence of gambling equilibrium
we require (α − r)D(r, r, nG(r)) ≤ ρC, i.e. (α − r) Cγ−r π+ρ1−π ≤ ρC
which, recalling (23), can be simplified to rP ≤ r. If furthermore
r < r1, then there is a gambling equilibrium where the ceiling is
binding in equilibrium and for any potential deviator.
We next analyze case (b) where RG(r) = r and the opti-
mal interest rate for the deviator is r∗ = 12
{
r + α− μDnG(r)
}
=
1
2
{
r + α− 1
D2
π+ρ
1−π
μC
γ−r
}
. For existence we require
Π(r) ≡ (α− r∗)D(r∗, r, nG(r) = (α− r∗)
{
r∗−r
μ D
2 + DnG(r)
}
≤ ρC
that is
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1
2
{
α− r + 1
D2
π+ρ
1−π
μC
γ−r
}{
1
2
[
α− 1
D2
π+ρ
1−π
μC
γ−r − r
]
D2
μ +
π+ρ
1−π
C
γ−r
}
≤ ρC
which can be simplified to{
(α− r)(γ − r) + 1D2 π+ρ1−πμC
}
×
{[
(α− r)(γ − r)− 1
D2
π+ρ
1−πμC
]
D2
μ + 2
π+ρ
1−πC
}
≤ 4ρC(γ − r)2
which cannot hold for large D. However this inequality is difficult
to analyze further. We make one more potentially useful observa-
tion. Using the envelope theorem we have
dΠ
dr = (α−r∗)
[
−D2μ − DnG(r)2
dnG(r)
dr
]
= (α−r∗)
[
−D2μ + π+ρ1−πC 1(γ−r)2
]
which is < 0 if D
2
μ >
π+ρ
1−πC
1
(γ−r)2 ⇔ (γ − r)2 > π+ρ1−π CμD2 ⇔ γ −
1
D
√
π+ρ
1−πCμ > r which is the case. Hence as r increases the profit of
a deviation decreases and hence a gambling equilibrium becomes
more likely to exist. This is of course what we would expect -
the whole point of an interest rate ceiling is to make a gambling
equilibrium less likely.
Appendix 4: Derivation of Figure 4
Fact 1: In panel (a) the curve C1C1, defined by equality of (24),
and the curve C2C2, defined by equality of (23), are such that C1C1
lies above C2C2 except at the point (π2, rP ) where the curves are
tangent.
Proof: Let
f (rj, r, n, π) :=
1− π
1 + ρ
(γ − rj)D(rj , r, n) + 1− π
1 + ρ
C
and
V (r, r, n, π) := max
rj≤r
f (rj , r, n, π) , V (r, r, n, π) := f (r, r, n, π) .
64
Then V (r, r, n, π) = V (r, r, n, π) if the constraint rj ≤ r is bind-
ing, which is the case we are interested in. Define moreover
V b (r, π) := V (r, r, nP (r) , π) , with nP (r) =
α− r
ρC
D,
and
V nb (r, π) := V (r, rP , nP , π) , with rP = α−
√
μρC
D
, nP =
√
μ
ρC
.
We know that r ≤ rP ⇔ nP (r) ≥ nP and r = rP ⇔ nP (r) = nP .
Since the curves C1C1 and C2C2 are by (24) and (23) the level
curves V nb (r, π) ≡ C and V b (r, π) ≡ C, respectively, and both
V nb (·) and V b (·) are differentiable functions, the claim will follow
from the following
Lemma 6. V b (r, π) ≥ V nb (r, π) for all r, π, and V b (r, π) =
V nb (r, π) if and only if r = rP .
Proof: V b ≥ V nb ⇔ D(r, r, nP (r)) ≥ D(r, rP , nP ) which by (2) is
equivalent to
D
nP (r)
+ (r − r) D
2
μ
≥ D
nP
+ (r − rP ) D
2
μ
⇔
1
α−r
ρC D
≥ 1√
μ
ρC
+
(
r − α+
√
μρC
D
)
D
μ
⇔
μρC
(α− r)D ≥
√
μρC − (α− r)D +
√
μρC
⇔
μρC − 2
√
μρC (α− r)D + (α− r)2D2 ≥ 0
⇔ (√
μρC − (α− r)D
)2
≥ 0
which is true. Moreover, we get equality iff
√
μρC = (α− r)D ⇔√
μ
ρC =
(α−r)D
ρC ⇔ nP = nP (r) . 
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Remark 7. There is a second way of proving tangency which
is the following. Let (dr/dπ)b and (dr/dπ)nb be defined implic-
itly by V b (r, π) ≡ C and V nb (r, π) ≡ C, respectively. From the
definitions of V b and V nb we get that (dr/dπ)b = (dr/dπ)nb iff
−∂V b/∂π
∂V b/∂r
= −∂V nb/∂π
∂V nb/∂r
⇔ ∂V /∂π
∂V
∂r
+ ∂V
∂r
+ ∂V
∂n
n′P (r)
= ∂V /∂π
∂V
∂r
⇔ ∂V∂r + ∂V∂n n′P (r) = 0 ⇔ ∂D∂r + ∂D∂nn′P (r) = 0
⇔ −D2μ − Dn2P (r)n
′
P (r) = 0 ⇔ − D(α−r
ρC
)2
D2
(
− DρC
)
= D
2
μ
⇔ α− r =
√
μρC
D ⇔ r = α−
√
μρC
D = rP .
Fact 2: The value of π in panel (a) at which curve C1C1 turns
vertical is the same at which in panel (b) k˜ (π) intersects the hor-
izontal axis, i.e. at π = π˜0.
Proof: We know that k˜ (π˜0) = 0 with π˜0 given by (15). Write
π˜0 = (A− 1) / (A+ 1/ρ) where A =
(
γ−α
2
D√
μρC
+ 1
)2
. Then the
term (ρ+ π) / (1− π) in (15) for π = π˜0 becomes
(ρA+ 1 +A− 1) / (A+ 1/ρ−A+ 1) = ρA.
The point on C1C1 where the curve turns vertical is where the two
roots r1 and r2 of the equality case of (24) coincide. This means
that the corresponding discriminant b2 − 4ac becomes[
(γ + α)− 2D
√
ρCμ
]2−4 [αγ − 2γD√ρCμ+ ρ(γ−α2 D√μρC + 1)2 CμD2 ]
and must be zero. To see the latter, rewrite the expression as
(γ + α)2 − 4γ+αD
√
ρCμ+ 4
D2
ρCμ− 4αγ + 8γD
√
ρCμ
−4ρCμ
D2
[
(γ−α)2
4
D2
μρC + (γ − α) D√μρC + 1
]
= (γ+α)2+
√
ρCμ
(
8γ
D − 4γ+αD
)
−4αγ−(γ − α)2−4 (γ − α)
√
ρCμ
D
= γ2+2αγ+α2−4αγ−γ2+2αγ−α2+
√
ρCμ
D (8γ − 4γ − 4α− 4γ + 4α)
= 0 .
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